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Abstract
This document describes the preliminary specification of services and protocols for the
Crutial Architecture. The Crutial Architecture definition, first addressed in Crutial Project Tech-
nical Report D4 (January 2007), intends to reply to a grand challenge of computer science and
control engineering: how to achieve resilience of critical information infrastructures, in particular
in the electrical sector.
The definitions herein elaborate on the major architectural options and components es-
tablished in the Preliminary Architecture Specification (D4), with special relevance to the Crutial
middleware building blocks, and are based on the fault, synchrony and topological models defined
in the same document. The document, in general lines, describes the Runtime Support Services
and APIs, and the Middleware Services and APIs. Then, it delves into the protocols, describing:
Runtime Support Protocols, and Middleware Services Protocols.
The Runtime Support Services and APIs chapter features as a main component, the Proactive-
Reactive Recovery Service, whose aim is to guarantee perpetual execution of any components it
protects.
The Middleware Services and APIs chapter describes our approach to intrusion-tolerant
middleware. The middleware comprises several layers. The Multipoint Network layer is the low-
est layer of CRUTIAL’s middleware, and features an abstraction of basic communication services,
such as provided by standard protocols, like IP, IPsec, UDP, TCP and SSL/TLS. The Communica-
tion Support Services feature two important building blocks: the Randomized Intrusion-Tolerant
Services (RITAS), and the Overlay Protection Layer (OPL) against DoS attacks. The Activity
Support Services currently defined comprise the CIS Protection service, and the Access Control
and Authorization service. Protection as described in this report is implemented by mechanisms
and protocols residing on a device called Crutial Information Switch (CIS). The Access Control
and Authorization service is implemented through PolyOrBAC, which defines the rules for in-
formation exchange and collaboration between sub-modules of the architecture, corresponding in
fact to different facilities of the CII’s organizations.The Monitoring and Failure Detection layer
contains a preliminary definition of the middleware services devoted to monitoring and failure
detection activities.
The remaining chapters describe the protocols implementing the above-mentioned ser-
vices: Runtime Support Protocols, and Middleware Services Protocols.
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1 Introduction
This document describes the preliminary specification of services and protocols for the
Crutial Architecture. The Crutial Architecture definition, first addressed in Crutial Project Tech-
nical Report D4 (January 2007), intends to reply to a grand challenge of computer science and
control engineering: how to achieve resilience of critical information infrastructures, in particular
in the electrical sector.
The scope considered spans the threats against computers and control computers, not the
physical infrastructures themselves. The focus are systems with great socio-economic value, such
as utility systems like electrical, gas or water, or telecommunication systems.
In the above-mentioned report, we laid down the basis for our work, whose final objectives
are:
• Ensuring acceptable levels of service and, in last resort, the integrity of systems themselves,
when faced with threats of several kinds. Doing so in an automatic and adaptive way.
• Taking into account the hybrid composition of those infrastructures: operational network,
called generically SCADA, devoted to the physical processes; corporate intranet, where
usual departmental services and clients reside; Internet, through which intranet users get to
other intranets and/or the outside world; interconnections between all of these, including
SCADA-Internet.
Intrusion tolerance, a workhorse of the Crutial approach, advocates the use of redundancy
to ensure that a system still delivers its service correctly even if some of its components are com-
promised. Typical protocols, said of ’Byzantine resilience’, or ’Byzantine fault tolerance’, only
operate correctly if at most a specified number f out of the n available replicas are compromised.
However, given a sufficient amount of time, a malicious and intelligent adversary can find ways to
compromise more than f replicas and collapse the whole system. The problem can be minimized
if the replicas are rejuvenated periodically, using a technique called proactive recovery, to remove
the effects of malicious attacks/faults. In fact, if the rejuvenation is performed sufficiently often,
then an attacker is never able to corrupt enough replicas to break the system, and the latter operates
perpetually. These paradigms outline the background of the approach of Crutial to resilience.
In this document, we present a preliminary specification of services and protocols of the
Crutial Architecture. The definitions herein elaborate on the major architectural options and com-
ponents established in the Preliminary Architecture Specification (D4), with special relevance to
the CRUTIAL middleware building blocks, and are based on the fault, synchrony and topological
models defined in the same document. The document, in general lines, describes the Runtime Sup-
port Services and APIs, and the Middleware Services and APIs. Then, it delves into the protocols,
describing: Runtime Support Protocols, and Middleware Services Protocols.
The Runtime Support Services and APIs chapter features as a main component, the Proactive-
Reactive Recovery Service, whose aim is to guarantee perpetual execution of any components it
protects.
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Figure 1.1: CRUTIAL middleware.
In Crutial we investigated limitations of existing approaches to intrusion-tolerant proactive
recovery, and proposed a very complete scheme addressing them, which we named proactive-
reactive recovery. Our first observation is that protecting oneself from timing attacks by using
asynchronous models, and fulfilling periodic recoveries, are incompatible goals. To address this
issue, we propose an innovative scheme based on a hybrid sync-asynchronous architecture, called
proactive resilience. Our second observation is that one should allow correct replicas that detect or
suspect that some replica is faulty, to accelerate the recovery of this replica. It is known that perfect
Byzantine failure detection is impossible to attain in a general way. In consequence, dealing with
imperfect failure detection is the most complex aspect of the proactive-reactive recovery service
presented.
The Middleware Services and APIs chapter describes our approach to intrusion-tolerant
middleware (see Figure 1.1). The middleware comprises several layers.
The Multipoint Network layer is the lowest layer of CRUTIAL’s middleware, and features
an abstraction of basic communication services, such as provided by standard protocols, like IP,
IPsec, UDP, TCP and SSL/TLS.
The Communication Support Services feature two important building blocks: the Random-
ized Intrusion-Tolerant Services (RITAS), and the Overlay Protection Layer (OPL) against DoS
attacks. The Randomized Intrusion-Tolerant Services (RITAS) are organised as a stack of ran-
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domized intrusion-tolerant protocols, supporting applications who depend on intrusion-tolerant
broadcast and agreement. These protocols, being randomized, overcome the impossibility result
in asynchronous settings established in [38] (also called the FLP result), but present a significant
performance improvement over previous protocols of the same class. In recent years DoS attacks
have become one of the most serious security threats to the Internet. Today Internet protocols
have become an emerging technology for remote control of industrial applications, and as such,
vulnerable to the same kind of attacks. We address an overlay protection layer for DoS attacks on
top of the normal infrastructure, for solving DoS Problem.
The Activity Support Services currently defined comprise the CIS Protection service, and
the Access Control and Authorization service.
The CRUTIAL reference architecture models the whole infrastructure architecture as a
WAN-of-LANs. This topology allows simple solutions to hard problems such as legacy control
subnetworks, and interconnection of critical and non-critical traffic, by defining realms with dif-
ferent levels of trustworthiness. The CIS Protection service protects realms from one another, i.e.,
a LAN from another LAN or from the WAN, thus allowing us to deal both with outsider and in-
sider threats. Protection as described in this report is implemented by mechanisms and protocols
residing on a device called CRUTIAL Information Switch (CIS).
The Access Control and Authorization service is implemented through PolyOrBAC, which
defines the rules for information exchange and collaboration between sub-modules of the architec-
ture, corresponding in fact to different facilities of the Critical Information Infrastructures (CII).
Each organization specifies its security policy according to OrBAC. As organizations are inter-
connected through CIS, each CIS regroups mechanisms to define security policy of systems that
compose each LAN (local and collaboration policies), and it also regroups mechanisms for col-
laboration: to make these LANs capable of collaboration and offering services to each other.
The Monitoring and Failure Detection section contains a preliminary definition of the
middleware services devoted to monitoring and failure detection activities. Diagnosis in Cru-
tial should occur at different components at different architectural levels, and as such, the classical
framework has been extended: several components need to be monitored and several deviation
detection mechanisms need to be in place, errors observed in different components must be corre-
lated. Likewise, given that we are dealing with a complex infrastructure, methods for distributed
diagnosis are mandatory, with a distinction between local and global detection and diagnosis.
The remaining chapters describe the protocols implementing the above-mentioned ser-
vices: Runtime Support Protocols, and Middleware Services Protocols.
82 Runtime Support Services and APIs
2.1 Proactive-Reactive Recovery Service
This section describes the proactive-reactive recovery service and its interface. The proto-
cols used to implement this service are presented in Section 4.1. Before describing the proactive-
reactive recovery service, we start by motivating the necessity of such a service, and by explaining
the system model in which the proactive-reactive recovery service is based.
2.1.1 Overview
One of the most challenging requirements of distributed systems being developed nowa-
days is to ensure that they operate correctly despite the occurrence of accidental and malicious
faults (including security attacks and intrusions). In the context of CRUTIAL, this problem is
specially relevant for an important class of systems that are employed in mission-critical applica-
tions such as the SCADA systems used to manage critical infrastructures like the Power grid. One
approach that promises to satisfy this requirement and that gained momentum recently is intru-
sion tolerance [90]. This approach recognizes the difficulty in building a completely reliable and
secure system and advocates the use of redundancy to ensure that a system still delivers its service
correctly even if some of its components are compromised.
A problem with “classical” intrusion-tolerant solutions based on Byzantine fault-tolerant
replication algorithms is the assumption that the system operates correctly only if at most f out of
n of its replicas are compromised. The problem here is that given a sufficient amount of time, a
malicious and intelligent adversary can find ways to compromise more than f replicas and collapse
the whole system.
Recently, some works showed that this problem can be solved (or at least minimized) if
the replicas are rejuvenated periodically, using a technique called proactive recovery [69]. These
previous works propose intrusion-tolerant replicated systems that are resilient to any number of
faults [17, 101, 15, 61, 80]. The idea is simple: replicas are periodically rejuvenated to remove the
effects of malicious attacks/faults. Rejuvenation procedures may change the cryptographic keys
and/or load a clean version of the operating system. If the rejuvenation is performed sufficiently
often, then an attacker is unable to corrupt enough replicas to break the system. Therefore, us-
ing proactive recovery, one can increase the resilience of any intrusion-tolerant replicated system
able to tolerate up to f faults/intrusions: an unbounded number of intrusions may occur during
its lifetime, as long as no more than f occur between rejuvenations. Both the interval between
consecutive rejuvenations and f must be specified at system deployment time according to the
expected rate of fault production.
An inherent limitation of proactive recovery is that a malicious replica can execute any
action to disturb the system’s normal operation (e.g., flood the network with arbitrary packets)
and there is little or nothing that a correct replica (that detects this abnormal behavior) can do
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to stop/recover the faulty replica. Our observation is that a more complete solution should allow
correct replicas that detect or suspect that some replica is faulty to accelerate the recovery of this
replica. We named this solution as proactive-reactive recovery and claim that it may improve the
overall performance of a system under attack by reducing the amount of time a malicious replica
has to disturb system normal operation without sacrificing periodic rejuvenation, which ensures
that even dormant faults will be removed from the system. The key property of our approach
is that, as long as the fault exhibited by a replica is detectable, this replica will be recovered as
soon as possible, ensuring that there is always an amount of system replicas available to sustain
system’s correct operation.
We recognize that perfect Byzantine failure detection is impossible to attain in a general
way, since what characterizes a malicious behavior is dependent on the application semantics [32,
31, 7, 45]. However, we argue that an important class of malicious faults can be detected, specially
the ones generated automatically by malicious programs such as virus, worms, and even botnets.
These kinds of attacks have little or no intelligence to avoid being detected by replicas carefully
monitoring the environment. However, given the imprecisions of the environment, some behaviors
can be interpreted as faults, while in fact they are only effects of overloaded replicas. In this way,
a reactive recovery strategy must address the problem of (possible wrong) suspicions to ensure
that recoveries are scheduled according to some fair policy in such a way that there is always a
sufficient number of replicas for the system to be available. In fact, dealing with imperfect failure
detection is the most complex aspect of the proactive-reactive recovery service presented in this
section.
2.1.2 Model of the System
Recently, it was shown that proactive recovery can only be implemented with a few syn-
chrony assumptions [81, 82]: in short, in an asynchronous system a compromised replica can
delay its recovery (e.g., by making its local clock slower) for a sufficient amount of time to allow
more than f replicas to be attacked. To overcome this fundamental problem, the proactive-reactive
recovery service is based on a hybrid system model [89] in which the system is composed of two
parts, with distinct properties and assumptions, let us call them payload and wormhole.
Payload. Any-synchrony system with n≥ a f +bk+1 replicas P1, ...,Pn. This part can range from
fully asynchronous to fully synchronous. At most f replicas can be subject to Byzantine failures
in a given recovery period and at most k replicas can be recovered at the same time. The exact
threshold depends on the application. For example, an asynchronous Byzantine fault-tolerant state
machine replication system requires n ≥ 3 f + 2k+ 1 while the CIS Protection Service presented
in Section 3.3.1 requires only n ≥ 2 f + k+1. If a replica does not fail between two recoveries it
is said to be correct, otherwise it is said to be faulty. We assume fault-independence for payload
replicas, i.e., the probability of a replica being faulty is independent of the occurrence of faults
in other replicas. This assumption can be substantiated in practice through the extensive use of
several kinds of diversity [68].
Wormhole. Synchronous subsystem with n local wormholes in which at most f local wormholes
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can fail by crash. These local wormholes are connected through a synchronous and secure control
channel, isolated from other networks. There is one local wormhole per payload replica and we
assume that when a local wormhole i crashes, the corresponding payload replica i crashes together.
Since the local wormholes are synchronous and the control channel used by them is isolated and
synchronous too, we assume several services in this environment:
1. wormhole clocks have a known precision, obtained by a clock synchronization protocol;
2. there is point-to-point timed reliable communication between every pair of local wormholes;
3. there is a timed reliable broadcast primitive with bounded maximum transmission time [44];
4. there is a timed atomic broadcast primitive with bounded maximum transmission time [44].
One should note that all of these services can be easily implemented in the crash-failure
synchronous distributed system model [92].
2.1.3 Service Description and Interface
The Proactive Resilience Model (PRM) The proactive-reactive recovery service builds on the
Proactive Resilience Model (PRM) briefly introduced in CRUTIAL deliverable D4. The PRM
addresses proactive recovery and defines a system enhanced with proactive recovery through a
model composed of two parts: the proactive recovery subsystem and the payload system, the
latter being proactively recovered by the former. Each of these two parts obeys different timing
assumptions and different fault models, and should be designed accordingly. The payload system
executes the “normal” applications and protocols. Thus, the payload synchrony and fault model
entirely depend on the applications/protocols executing in this part of the system. For instance,
the payload may operate in an asynchronous Byzantine way. The proactive recovery subsystem
executes the proactive recovery protocols that rejuvenate the applications/protocols running in the
payload part. This subsystem is more demanding in terms of timing and fault assumptions, and it
is modeled as a distributed component called Proactive Recovery Wormhole (PRW).
The Proactive Recovery Wormhole (PRW) The distributed PRW is composed of a local mod-
ule in every host called the local PRW, which may be interconnected by a synchronous and secure
control channel. The PRW executes periodic rejuvenations through a periodic timely execution
service with two parameters: TP and TD. Namely, each local PRW executes a rejuvenation proce-
dure F in rounds, each round is initiated within TP from the last triggering, and the execution time
of F is bounded by TD. Notice that if local recoveries are not coordinated, then the system may
present unavailability periods during which a large number (possibly all) replicas are recovering.
For instance, if the replicated system tolerates up to f arbitrary faults, then it will typically become
unavailable if f +1 replicas recover at the same time, even if no “real” fault occurs. Therefore, if
a replicated system able to tolerate f Byzantine servers is enhanced with periodic recoveries, then
availability is guaranteed by (i.) defining the maximum number of replicas allowed to recover in
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parallel (call it k); and (ii.) deploying the system with a sufficient number of replicas to tolerate f
Byzantine servers and k simultaneous recovery servers. Figure 2.1 illustrates the rejuvenation pro-
cess. Replicas are recovered in groups of at most k elements, by some specified order: for instance,
replicas {P1, ...,Pk} are recovered first, then replicas {Pk+1, ...,P2k} follow, and so on. Notice that
k defines the number of replicas that may recover simultaneously, and consequently the number
of distinct dnke rejuvenation groups that recover in sequence. For instance, if k = 2, then at most
two replicas may recover simultaneously in order to guarantee availability. This means also that at
least dn2e rejuvenation groups (composed of two replicas) will need to exist, and they can not re-
cover at the same time. Notice that the number of rejuvenation groups determines a lower-bound
on the value of TP and consequently defines the minimum window of time an adversary has to
compromise more than f replicas. From the figure it is easy to see that TP ≥ dnkeTD.
time
{P1...Pk} {Pn-k+1...Pn}...
recover 
k replicas
recover 
k replicas
{P1...Pk} {Pn-k+1...Pn}...
≤TP
≤TD
recover 
k replicas
recover 
k replicas
recover n replicas in      groups  
≤TP
≤TD



k
n
recover n replicas in      groups  


k
n
Figure 2.1: Relationship between the rejuvenation period TP, the rejuvenation execution time TD,
and k.
The Proactive-Reactive Recovery Wormhole (PRRW) We extended the PRW to trigger both
proactive and reactive recoveries and named the new component Proactive-Reactive Recovery
Wormhole (PRRW). The PRRW is then the distributed component that offers the proactive-reactive
recovery service. This service needs input information from the payload replicas in order to trigger
reactive recoveries. This information is obtained through two interface functions: W suspect( j)
and W detect( j). Figure 2.2 presents this idea.
Replica 1
PRRW
…
W_suspect(j) W_detect(j)
Replica 2
W_suspect(j) W_detect(j)
Replica n
W_suspect(j) W_detect(j)
Figure 2.2: PRRW architecture.
A payload replica i calls W suspect( j) to notify the PRRW that the replica j is suspected
of being failed. This means that replica i suspects replica j but it does not know for sure if it is
really failed. Otherwise, if replica i knows without doubt that replica j is failed, thenW detect( j)
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is called instead. Notice that the service is generic enough to deal with any kind of replica failures,
e.g., crash and Byzantine. For instance, replicas may: use an unreliable crash failure detector [18]
(or a muteness detector [32]) and callW suspect( j)when a replica j is suspected of being crashed;
or detect that a replica j is sending unexpected messages or messages with incorrect content
[7, 45], calling W detect( j) in this case.
If f + 1 different replicas suspect and/or detect that replica j is failed, then this replica
is recovered. This recovery can be done immediately, without endangering availability, in the
presence of at least f +1 detections, given that in this case at least one correct replica detected that
replica j is really failed. Otherwise, if there are only f +1 suspicions, the replica may be correct
and the recovery must be coordinated with the periodic proactive recoveries in order to guarantee
that a minimum number of correct replicas is always alive to ensure the system availability. The
quorum of f + 1 in terms of suspicions or detections is needed to avoid recoveries triggered by
faulty replicas: at least one correct replica must detect/suspect a replica for some recovery action
to be taken.
It is worth to notice that the proactive-reactive recovery service is completely orthogonal
to the failure/intrusion detection strategy used by a system. The proposed service only exports op-
erations to be called when a replica is detected/suspected to be faulty. In this sense, any approach
for fault detection (including Byzantine) [18, 32, 7, 45], system monitoring [25] and/or intrusion
detection [27, 63] can be integrated in a system that uses the PRRW. The overall effectiveness
of our approach, i.e., how fast a compromised replica is recovered, is a direct consequence of
detection/diagnosis accuracy.
Ensuring Availability The proactive-reactive recovery service initiates recoveries both periodi-
cally (time-triggered) and whenever something bad is detected or suspected (event-triggered). As
explained before, periodic recoveries are done in groups of at most k replicas, so no more than
k replicas are recovering at the same time. However, the interval between the recovery of each
group is not tight. Instead we allocate d fk e intervals for recovery between periodic recoveries such
that they can be used by event-triggered recoveries. This amount of time is allocated to make
possible at most f recoveries between each periodic recovery, in this way being able to handle the
maximum number of faults assumed.
The approach is based on real-time scheduling with an aperiodic server task to model
aperiodic tasks [83]. The idea is to consider the action of recovering as a resource and to ensure
that no more than k correct replicas will be recovering simultaneously. As explained before, this
condition is important to ensure that the system always stays available. Two types of real-time
tasks are utilized by the proposed mechanism:
• task Ri: represents the periodic recovery of up to k replicas (in parallel). All these tasks have
worst case execution time TD and period TP;
• task A: is the aperiodic server task, which can handle at most d fk e recoveries (of up to
k replicas) every time it is activated. This task has worst case execution time d fk eTD and
period (d fk e+1)TD.
2. RUNTIME SUPPORT SERVICES AND APIS 13
Task Ri is executed at up to k different local wormholes, while task A is executed in all
wormholes, but only the ones with the payload detected/suspected of being faulty are (aperiod-
ically) recovered. The time needed for executing one A and one Ri is called the recovery slot i
and is denoted by Tslot. Every slot i has d fk e recovery subslots belonging to the A task, each one
denoted by Sip, plus a Ri. Figure 2.3 illustrates how time-triggered periodic and event-triggered
aperiodic recoveries are combined.
Figure 2.3: Recovery schedule (in an Si j or Ri subslot there can be at most k parallel replica
recoveries).
In the figure it is easy to see that when our reactive recovery scheduling approach is em-
ployed, the value of TP must be increased. In fact, TP should be greater or equal than dnke(d fk e+
1)TD, which means that reactive recoveries increase the rejuvenation period by a factor of (d fk e+
1). This is not a huge increase since f is expected to be small. In order to simplify the presentation
of the algorithms, in the remaining of the report it is assumed that TP = dnke(d fk e+1)TD.
Notice that a reactive recovery only needs to be scheduled according to the described
mechanism if the replica i to recover is only suspected of being failed (it is not assuredly failed),
i.e., if less than f + 1 replicas have called W detect() (but the total number of suspicions and
detections is higher than f + 1). If the wormholeWi knows with certainty that replica i is faulty,
i.e., if a minimum of f + 1 replicas have called W detect(i), replica i can be recovered without
availability concerns, since it is accounted as one of the f faulty replicas.
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3 Middleware Services and APIs
The Middleware Services and APIs chapter describes our approach to intrusion-tolerant
middleware. The middleware comprises several layers, such as Multipoint Network, Communi-
cation and Activity Support, and Monitoring and Failure Detection.
3.1 Multipoint Network
Multipoint Network (MN) is the lowest layer of CRUTIAL’s middleware. Its purpose
is to offer a simple abstraction of the basic communication services provided by the underlying
network infrastructure, which can then be utilized in an uniform way by the higher layers of the
middleware. These services are said to be “basic” in the sense that they are implemented by
standard protocols, like IP, IPsec, UDP, TCP and SSL/TLS. This section presents some of the
protocols that can be integrated in the MN module, their services and APIs. The presentation
is organized in terms of the two relevant layers of the TCP/IP reference model to which these
protocols belong: Network and Transport. We skip the lowest layers for which there are many
technologies and are too low level to be considered middleware: Ethernet (wired and wireless),
SDH/ATM, Frame Relay, copper circuits, etc. Application layer protocols, like some protocols
specific for critical infrastructures and industrial systems (MMS and ICCP), are also not described
since they are seen at a higher level than the middleware.
3.1.1 Internet Protocol
The main service provided by the Network layer in the Internet is routing data packets
– datagrams – from the source host to the destination host. Hosts are interconnected by special
nodes called routers that inspect the datagrams to forward – or route – them to the next router or
the destination. The format of the datagrams is defined by the most widely used Network layer
protocol in the Internet, the Internet Protocol (IP). Nowadays, IP underlies most communication
networks around the world, including the Internet, corporate networks and even some control
networks, so it is important to give some insight about it.
The most important data in an IP datagram are the source and destination host addresses.
A host or, more precisely, each host’s network interface is identified by an IP address, which has
32 bits in IPv4, the current almost universally adopted version of IP. A shift to IPv6 is currently
happening, although there is a high uncertainty about when it will end or even reach most of the
Internet. IP also provides other services like fragmentation and reassembly of packets too big for
the size of the packet transported by the physical network. IP does not ensure the reliability of the
communication, i.e., datagrams can be dropped or duplicated.
IP can also be used to send messages to multiple destinations, something that is called IP
multicast. This is important for CRUTIAL middleware since it involves multicast to several hosts,
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e.g., for several CIS. The multicasted datagram is delivered to all members of a certain group with
the same guarantees given by the regular IP datagrams: it is not guaranteed to reach all members,
it is not guaranteed to arrive intact to all members and it is not guaranteed to arrive in the same
order to all members, relative to other datagrams. Hosts can join and leave the group at any time,
i.e., group membership is dynamic. Multicast groups cannot span the whole Internet since not
all routers support this functionality. Typically there are “islands” of routers in the Internet that
support it.
The classical API to IP is the sockets API, originally defined in Berkeley Unix. Several
versions appeared since them, starting in other Unixes, and up to MS-Windows and Java, to give
some examples. However, sockets are not usually used to send IP datagrams directly – so called
raw sockets – but instead at transport level to send data over UDP or TCP, so more details are
provided below. IP multicast is also typically used below UDP, and the same reasoning applies to
the API.
3.1.2 Internet Protocol Security
Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) is an extension of IP that provides some level of security
[52]. In its basic form, IP messages can be modified and its content read by anyone with access
to the network, e.g., a hacker controlling a router. IPSec prevents this problem. IPSec has an
important role in CRUTIAL since it is a basic mechanism to ensure security in the Network layer.
IPSec is designed to enhance the security of IPv4, providing interoperable, high-quality,
cryptographically-based security. It offers several services, such as access control, connectionless
integrity, data origin authentication, protection against replays, confidentiality (through encryp-
tion) and limited traffic flow confidentiality. Since these services are offered at the Network/IP
layer, they can be used by any higher layer protocol, such as TCP, UDP, HTTP, etc. IPSec also
supports negotiation of IP compression, motivated by the observation that encryption used within
IPSec prevents effective compression by lower protocol layers.
IPSec is divided in two (sub)protocols, which may be applied alone or in combination with
each other to provide the desired set of security properties at IP-level:
• Authentication Header (AH) – provides connectionless integrity, data origin authentication,
and an optional anti-replay service.
• Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP) – provides payload confidentiality (using encryp-
tion) and limited traffic flow confidentiality. Optionally, it may also provide connectionless
integrity, data origin authentication, and an anti-replay service.
Both AH and ESP are vehicles for access control, based on the distribution of crypto-
graphic keys and the management of traffic flows relative to these security protocols. These pro-
tocols support two different modes of operation. At Transport mode, IPSec essentially protects
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upper layer protocols (e.g., TCP). At Tunnel mode, the protocols are applied to tunneled IP pack-
ets, i.e., the IP datagrams themselves are sent through a secure tunnel. IPSec allows the user or
the system administrator to control the granularity at which a security service is offered, allowing,
for example, the creation of a single encrypted tunnel to carry all the traffic between two security
gateways or a separate encrypted tunnel for each TCP connection between a pair of hosts com-
municating across these gateways. IPSec can be configured to protect only the integrity of the
communication (preventing modifications) or the integrity and the confidentiality of the traffic.
Most IPSec implementations do not have an API that can be used by applications to trans-
mit secure data, other than the socket API used for IP, UDP or TCP. IPSec works at the operating
system level, and typically can only be configured by the system administrator. A system admin-
istrator can define the policy for IPSec on a host basis, determining the ways by which a host can
connect securely to another.
3.1.3 User Datagram Protocol and Transmission Control Protocol
Network-level IP solves the problem of end-to-end communication between hosts. How-
ever, for implementing distributed applications, the problem that really has to be solved is slightly
different: end-to-end communication between processes, since typically there are many processes
running in each host. This is the problem solved by the Transport layer. In IP-based networks
hosts are identified by IP addresses; inside a host, application are identified by ports (one or more),
which are 16-bit numbers (range 0-65535). The standard Transport layer Internet protocols are the
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). Both protocols are
used to support communication in critical infrastructures, so both are relevant for the CRUTIAL
middleware.
UDP provides a datagram mode of packet-switched computer communication in an inter-
connected set of computer networks. Applications can send messages to other programs with a
minimum set of guarantees using UDP. The key characteristics of the protocol are: it is transaction
oriented, the delivery of messages is not ensured, nor is the order of message arrival, and there
might be duplication of messages. UDP in fact is a thin layer on top of IP, which does not provide
more guarantees, only adds information about the source and destination applications, i.e., the
source and destination ports.
TCP, on the other hand, is a connection-oriented, end-to-end reliable protocol designed to
fit into a layered hierarchy of protocols supporting multi-network applications. Applications can
send data using TCP, in a reliable way, to other programs on host computers attached to distinct
but interconnected computer communication networks. TCP does not rely on the protocols below
for reliability, but rather assumes that it can obtain a (potentially) unreliable datagram service
from the lower level protocols, typically IP. A TCP connection serves to send a stream of data
(not independent datagrams), which in practice is split in TCP segments. Reliability means that
segments are delivered in the order they were sent and unmodified. In practice, these properties are
ensured using a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) to detect modifications, and retransmissions to
recover frommissing or corrupted segments. A disruption of the network can interrupt the delivery
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of the stream of data if a timeout causes TCP to break the connection. TCP segments include the
source and destination ports.
The CRC code in TCP segments is used to detect accidental modifications, e.g., due to line
noise. However, in terms of security it does not protect the segments since a malicious hacker can
modify the segment plus the CRC code to fit the segment modification. Malicious modifications
have to be detected using Message Authentication Codes (MAC), like those provided by IPSec.
In fact, reliable and secure end-to-end application communication can be implemented using TCP
over IPSec.
TCP is a complex protocol, with several other mechanisms that are not discussed here.
Examples are flow control (to prevent segments from being sent when the reception buffer has
no space), slow start (to avoid contributing to network congestion when a TCP connection is
established) and fast retransmit (to cause an earlier retransmission of missing segments).
The classical programming interface for TCP and UDP is the Berkeley Unix Socket API,
although today there are many adaptations of this API available, like the Java sockets API, pro-
vided by the Java programming language. In what follows we consider the classical socket API.
The three basic calls are:
• socket() – creates a socket, i.e., a communication endpoint with an IP address, a protocol
(TCP or UDP) and a port (set by default);
• bind() – associates a specific IP address, protocol and port to the socket;
• close() – destroys a socket.
In the case of TCP there are a few specific calls related to establishing a connection be-
tween two machines: a server, that waits for connections, and a client, that makes connections.
The calls are:
• listen() – executed in the server side to state the maximum number of connections that may
be pending at a certain instant;
• accept() – blocks the server waiting for connections, or picks a pending connection;
• connect() – called by the client to establish a connection with a server.
There are several calls used to send and receive messages, such as write(), sendto(), read()
and recvfrom(). To configure some parameters of the sockets there are calls like ioctl() and
setsockopt() that can be used. For instance, setsockopt() can be used to add/remove a host to/from
an IP multicast group. Finally, the select() call is often used for a server to block waiting for
messages from several sockets, instead of only one. Alternatively, a server can be multithreaded
and have one thread blocked waiting for messages in each port.
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3.1.4 Secure Socket Layer
The Secure Socket Layer (SSL) [46, 40], later standardized as Transport Layer Security
(TLS), is a security extension to TCP. It basically provides authentication of the hosts involved
in the communication, and confidentiality and integrity of the communication. SSL/TLS is a
modification of TCP. The initial handshaking is followed by a negotiation of the cryptographic
algorithms to use and the creation of a session key. Authentication is based on public-key cryp-
tography and digital certificates, and can be mutual (both peers authenticate themselves), one-way
or simply not done. Integrity and (optionally) confidentiality of data are guaranteed using the ses-
sion key, respectively by adding a MAC and encrypting the data. The security guarantees provided
by SSL/TLS are similar to those provided by TCP over IPSec, except for the more powerful au-
thentication scheme and the usual availability of a user-level API, something that is not common
with IPSec.
SSL/TLS is provided by packets like OpenSSL and languages like Java. The basic APIs
tend to be quite similar to the TCP sockets API. However there are usually a set of calls to define
the location of the certificates, if confidentiality is turned on or off, to select which cryptographic
algorithms should be used, etc.
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3.2 Communication Support Services
This section presents the communication support services, which feature two main build-
ing blocks: the Randomized Intrusion-Tolerant Services, and the Overlay Protection Layer against
DoS attacks. These services can be utilized for instance by the implementations of the activity
support services, or by applications that need to have high levels resilience to accidental faults or
malicious attacks.
3.2.1 Randomized Intrusion-Tolerant Services
With the increasing need of our society to deal with computer- and network-based attacks,
the area of intrusion tolerance has been gaining momentum over the past few years. Arising
from the intersection of two classical areas of computer science, fault tolerance and security, its
objective is to guarantee the correct behavior of a system even if some of its components are
compromised and controlled by an intelligent adversary.
A pivotal problem in fault- and intrusion-tolerant distributed systems is consensus. This
problem has been specified in different ways, but basically it aims to ensure that n processes are
able to propose some values and then all agree on one of these values. The relevance of consen-
sus is considerable because it has been shown equivalent to several other distributed problems,
such as state machine replication and atomic broadcast. Consensus, however, cannot be solved
deterministically in asynchronous systems if a single process can crash (also known as the FLP
impossibility result [38]). This is a significant result, in particular for intrusion-tolerant systems,
because they usually assume an asynchronous model in order to avoid time dependencies. Time
assumptions can often be broken, for example, with denial of service attacks.
Throughout the years, several techniques have been proposed to circumvent the FLP result,
and among them randomization is particularly interesting because it requires no extra assumptions
on the environment. Randomized Intrusion-Tolerant Asynchronous Services (RITAS) is a stack of
randomized intrusion-tolerant protocols (also called Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols) for dis-
tributed systems. Figure 5.1 depicts the RITAS stack. It provides several services to applications
who need to perform broadcasts and execute several flavors of consensus operations in a poten-
tially malicious environment. All protocols in the stack rely on two standard Internet services
that are abstracted by the MN: the IPSec Authentication Header protocol (AH) and the Transmis-
sion Control Protocol (TCP). These two protocols provide authenticated reliable communication
channels for the rest of the stack.
The fundamental communication services that are offered by the stack are an echo, reliable
and atomic broadcast among the members of the group of processes that implement the applica-
tion. Based on these communication primitives, RITAS supports various kinds of agreement (or
consensus) services. The most basic one is the binary consensus, which allows processes to agree
on a single bit of data. There is also a multi-valued consensus service that can be employed
to reach agreement on values of arbitrary length. Finally, the vector consensus service supports
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agreements on vectors of values of arbitrary length.
3.2.1.1 Service Description and Interface
RITAS exports a simple API for applications who wish to access the protocols provided by
the stack to build distributed systems services. The API revolves around the RITAS context data
structure ritas t, however, this data type is completely opaque to the application programmer.
Functions provided by the API can be divided into two categories: context management and
service requests. A typical RITAS session is composed by 4 basic steps executed by each process:
1. Initialize the RITAS context by calling ritas init().
2. Add the participating processes to the context by calling ritas proc add ipv4().
3. Call the communication and consensus protocols as many times as wished (however, func-
tions are blocking and not thread-safe).
4. Destroy the RITAS context by calling ritas destroy().
Context Management Functions The context management functions allow for the basic man-
agement of a communication session. This includes the initialization and destruction of a session
context, and the addition of processes to the session. Since the notion of group in RITAS is static,
the addition of processes can only be performed before any kind of communication takes place.
There is no operation to remove processes from the group since this would be incongruent with
the system model and break the correctness of the protocols.
ritas t ∗ ritas init(u short pid, u short n, u short f , u short port, u char ∗ errbuf );
ritas init() initializes a new RITAS context. It allocates the necessary memory space for
the ritas t data structure and initializes its internal variables and data structures. The main ar-
guments are: a process identifier pid; the total number of processes n; the maximum number of
corrupt processes f . In case of success the function returns a pointer to a freshly created RITAS
context; otherwise, it returns NULL and an appropriate zero-terminated error message is copied to
errbuf .
void ritas destroy(ritas t ∗ ctx);
ritas destroy() destroys a previously initialized RITAS context, ctx. The internal context
data structures are freed from memory along with the context itself.
int ritas proc add ipv4(ritas t ∗ ctx, u short id, u char ∗ ip, u short port, u char ∗ key);
ritas proc add ipv4() adds a process to the context, ctx. The functions takes as argument
a pointer to the IPv4 address of the process, ip. In case of success, the function returns 1; in case
of failure returns -1.
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Service Request Functions The service request functions give the application programmer ac-
cess to the actual protocols provided by the stack. These functions can be divided in two groups,
one for the broadcast primitives and another for the various consensus protocols. The service re-
quest functions can only be called after the relevant session context has been properly initialized
and the individual processes added to the group. When a session context is destroyed, no service
requests functions for that particular session can be called afterwards.
int ritas rb bcast(ritas t ∗ ctx, u short rbid, u char ∗buf , u short buf s);
ritas rb bcast() reliably broadcasts a message to the group. The function takes as argu-
ments a pointer to the relevant session context ritas t. An identifier for the broadcast rbid. A
pointer to a buffer buf containing the message to be broadcasted. Finally, the size of message
buf s in bytes. In case of success, the function returns 1; in case of failure returns -1.
int ritas rb recv(ritas t ∗ ctx, u short txid, u short rbid, u char ∗buf , u short buf s);
ritas rb recv() delivers a message that was reliably broadcasted by some process belong-
ing to the group. The function blocks until it is able to deliver the relevant message. It takes as
arguments a pointer to the session context ritas t. The identifier of the sender process txid. An
identifier for the broadcast rbid. A pointer to a buffer buf in which the delivered message should
be stored. The maximum length buf s in bytes that the buffer can hold. In case of success, the
function returns the length of the message in bytes; otherwise it returns -1.
int ritas bc(ritas t ∗ ctx, u short bcid, u char proposal);
ritas bc() runs a binary consensus execution with identifier bcid. The proposal value is
passed to the function as an argument, and the latter blocks until the processes reach a decision.
In case of success the functions returns the decision value which is either 0 or 1; in case of failure
the function returns -1.
int ritas mvc(ritas t ∗ ctx, u short mvcid, u char ∗prop, u short prop size,
u char ∗decision, u short decision size);
ritas mvc() runs a multi-valued consensus execution identified bymvcid. The pointer prop
points to a buffer containing the proposal value, and prop size is the size of this data. Another
pointer decision is used to reference the memory location where the decision value should be
stored. The maximum length of data that can be stored in this buffer is indicated by decision s.
In case of success, the function returns the length of the decision value in bytes; in case of failure
returns -1.
int ritas vc(ritas t ∗ ctx, u short vcid, u char ∗proposal, u short prop size,
u char ∗decision, u short decision size);
ritas vc() runs vector consensus executions identified by vcid. The functions blocks until
a decision is reached. The proposal value is passed as a pointer to a buffer proposal containing the
value of length prop s. The decision vector is stored in the buffer pointed by vec. The maximum
length of data that this buffer can hold is indicated by vec s. In case of success, the function returns
the length of the decision vector in bytes; in case of failure returns -1. The decision vector can
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be extracted into a data structure ritas vector t that makes it easier to process using the ancillary
function ritas vector extract().
int ritas ab bcast(ritas t ∗ ctx, u char ∗buf , u short buf s);
ritas ab bcast() atomically broadcasts a message to the group. The message is passed as
a pointer to the buffer buf that holds it. The message length is indicated by buf s. In case of
success, the function returns 1; in case of failure returns -1.
int ritas ab recv(ritas t ∗ ctx, u char ∗buf , u short buf s, ritas ab header t ∗abh);
ritas ab recv() delivers a message that was atomically broadcasted by some process in the
group. The functions blocks until a message is delivered. The message is stored in the buffer
pointed by buf . The maximum length in bytes that the buffer can hold is indicated by buf s. The
function takes a pointer abh to a data structure ritas ab header t where it is stored some meta-
information about the delivered message such as its total order number. In case of success, the
function returns the length of the message in bytes; otherwise it returns -1.
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3.2.2 Overlay Protection Against Denial-of-Service Attacks
The Internet was designed for the minimal processing and best-effort forwarding of any
packet, malicious or not. For attackers this architecture provides an uncontrolled network path to
victims. DoS attacks exploit this to target mission-critical services. In recent years DoS attacks
have become one of the most serious security threats to the Internet. This is because they may
result in massive service disruptions and also because they have proven to be difficult to defend
against. An estimate of worldwide DoS attack shows more than 12000 attacks on over 5000
distinct Internet hosts during a three week period in 2001 [62]. The 2004 CSI/FBI computer crime
and security also shows DoS attacks are among most financially expensive security incidents [42].
Today, the Internet has become an emerging technology for remote control of industrial
applications (e.g. power plants controllers) [21]. In such an environment, the communication path
among application sites needs to be kept clear of interferences such as the ones created by DoS
attacks: attacks that attempt to overwhelm the processing units or link capacity of the target site
(or routers that are topologically close) by saturating with malicious packets.
Solving the network DoS problem is hard, given the fundamentally open nature of the
Internet and the apparent reluctance of router vendors and network operators to deploy and operate
new, potentially complex mechanisms. However, there are various approaches to solving DoS
problems (see below). Though many DoS countermeasures have been proposed recently, it is not
clear that any of them is able to stop Internet DoS attacks in the foreseeable future.
In this section, we address a protection layer for DoS attacks on top of today’s existing IP
infrastructure, where the communication is among application sites, located anywhere in the wide-
area network, that have authorization to communicate with that location. This section focuses on
how to design an Overlay Protection Layer (OPL) to solving DoS Problem.
Several researchers are exploring the use of overlay networks to tolerate DoS attacks [54,
84, 97]. The key idea is to hide application locations behind an overlay (proxy) network. Applica-
tion sites can communicate with each other via the overlay network, where attackers cannot easily
trace and locate the application sites to launch attacks. Location-hiding is an important compo-
nent of a complete solution to DoS attacks. It gives application sites the capability to hide their
IP addresses, thereby preventing DoS attacks, which depend on the knowledge of the victim’s IP
address. In general location-hiding schemes provide a ”safety period” for application sites. In this
section, we discuss how to design the overlay protection layer such that it is secure enough, given
attackers who have a large but finite set of resources to perform the attacks. The attackers know
the IP addresses of the nodes that participate in the overlay and also IP addresses of application
sites. However, a few nodes have secret IP addresses in the OPL architecture.
We evaluate the OPL architecture performance by simulation and evaluate the likelihood
that an attacker is able to prevent communication among application sites. Results show that
even the attackers are able to launch massive attacks they are very unlikely to prevent successful
communication. For example, in a static attack case (focused attack on a fixed set of nodes), DoS
attacks completely are countered. In a dynamic attack case, if attackers can launch attacks upon
50% of nodes in the overlay, still 75% of communications among application sites are successful.
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3.2.2.1 Background
This section presents a short overview of DoS problem, and describes some of the current
defense techniques against it.
DoS Attacks
DoS attacks are a major security threat against availability in the Internet. In a DoS at-
tack, attackers consume resources, on which either the applications or accesses to the applications
depend, making the applications unavailable to the users. There are two classes of DoS attacks:
application-level attacks and infrastructure-level attacks [97].
Application-level DoS attack: attackers attack through the application interface; for ex-
ample, attackers overload an application by sending abusive workload, malicious requests which
lead to application crash, extra CPU processing, system reboot, or general system slowing down.
In this type, an attacker can also render a computing resource unavailable by modifying the sys-
tem configuration (such as its static routing tables or password files). In fact attackers attack
the system by exploiting weaknesses in the application software. This type of vulnerability typ-
ically originates in inadequate software assurance testing or negligent patching. Such DoS at-
tacks are generally addressed through hardened security policies and authentication mechanisms.
Application-level DoS attacks are application-specific and do not require the target application’s
IP address.
Infrastructure-level DoS attack: attackers directly attack the resource of the service in-
frastructure, such as the networks and hosts of the application service; for example, attackers send
flood of bogus packets to saturate the target network. Infrastructure-level DoS attacks only require
knowledge of application site addresses, i.e., IP addresses.
Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks are large scale DoS attacks which employ
a large number of attackers distributed across the Internet. There are two steps in such attacks.
First, attackers build large zombie networks by compromising many Internet hosts, and installing
a zombie program on each. Second, attackers activate this large zombie network, directing them
to DoS a target.
In the rest of this section we will focus on infrastructure-level DoS attacks. Therefore,
whenever we say DoS attack, we refer to infrastructure-level DoS attack.
DoS Resilience Techniques
Figure 3.1 shows countermeasure techniques against the DoS problem. Countermeasure
techniques are classified into reactive and proactive categories.
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Figure 3.1: Countermeasure techniques against DoS attacks.
Reactive Techniques They monitor traffic at a target location, waiting for an attack to occur.
After the attack is identified, typically via analysis of traffic patterns and packet headers, the
countermeasure techniques are established (filtering techniques or source trace back techniques).
• Filtering techniques: in some cases the malicious packet flows can be identified on clearly-
defined metrics, e.g., obviously wrong source address or other obvious errors in packet
header. Such packet flows can be filtered at routers using some of the following techniques:
– Ingress filtering [36] : routers check a packet for its source IP address, and block
packets that come from an address beyond the routers’ possible ingress address range.
This requires a router to accumulate sufficient knowledge to distinguish between le-
gitimate and illegitimate addresses, thus it is most feasible in customer networks or at
the border of Internet Service Providers (ISP) where address ownership is relatively
unambiguous.
– Distributed Packet Filtering (DPF) [70] : it explores the power-law of Internet topol-
ogy in source address validation. It can be distributed at core routers to proactively stop
packet flows with obviously wrong source addresses, and meanwhile to reactively trace
back the attacking sources. Empirical experiments show that DPF can efficiently iden-
tify spoofed address outside the autonomous system (AS) where the attackers reside.
– Source Address Validity Enforcement (SAVE) [57] : in SAVE, symmetry between
destination forwarding and source validation is explored to realize a protocol similar
to Internet routing, but along the reverse direction for maintaining an incoming tree of
authenticated sources. The protocol enables SAVE routers to filter malicious packet
flows.
However, filtering techniques suffer from some problems:
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1. Since filtering is rendered per-flow, routers must possess sufficient power to process a
large number of flows simultaneously.
2. The scalability concern in Internet core routers which could already be heavily loaded
due to empirical experience obtained from per-flow based Internet.
3. The accuracy with which legitimate traffic can be distinguished from the DoS traffic.
4. The methods that filter traffic by known patterns or statistical anomalies in traffic pat-
terns can be defeated by changing the attack pattern and masking the anomalies that
are sought by the filter.
• Source Traceback [77, 79] : typically, traceback methods include packet-based marking,
link testing, and verifying logging. Packet-based marking is normally comprised of two
complementary components: a marking procedure executed by routers in the network and a
path reconstruction procedure implemented by the victim. The routers augment IP packets
with address marks en-route, then the victims can use information embedded in the IP pack-
ets to trace the attack back to the actual source. Instead of packet marking, an alternative
method is to generate traceback information using separate IP control information such as
link testing messages and verifiable logging messages.
However, the source trace-back defense techniques have some problems:
1. The trace-back mechanisms incur overhead in the form of control message processing,
storage, and communication.
2. It is not quick and suffers a long delay to protect victim.
3. It does not address the DDoS problem.
4. Often the source of the attack is not real culprit but simply a node that has been re-
motely subverted by a cracker (zombie machine). The attacker can just start using
another compromised node.
Passive Techniques These techniques do not require detection mechanisms. They prevent tar-
gets from DoS problem either by considering some controls in the network or transport layers
(e.g., rate control techniques) or by using the interface layer (e.g., hide location techniques).
• Rate Control Techniques [41, 99] : in many cases, there is no clear boundary between DoS
attack and insufficient service availability. Countermeasures based on rate control seek to
enforce fairness in bandwidth allocation, thus minimize the damage caused by DoS attacks.
In fact the idea of doing rate control is to identify the per-packet processing cost for different
types of packets, and limited the flow rates such that the end server does not go into overload
situation. Different rate limiting policies could be applied to different classes of traffic based
on the resources they consume. Figure 3.2 shows rate control techniques from high level
view.
However, the main problem of this approach is that its effectiveness is reduced when the
number of attacking flows is large. Also if an attacker attacks with different types of packets,
it cannot tolerate many attacks very well.
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Figure 3.2: Rate control mechanism from high level view [41].
• Location-Hiding Techniques : location-hiding is an important component of a complete
solution to DoS attacks. It gives application sites the capability to hide their locations and
thereby preventing DoS attacks, which depend on the knowledge of their locations.
Overlay networks have been proposed as a means for location hiding. An overlay network
is used to mediate all communications among application sites. As long as the mediation
can be enforced, the overlay network is the only public interface for reaching an application
site, and the application site cannot be directly attacked.
Many location-hiding mechanisms use overlay networks. As shown in [54, 84, 85, 97] it
is feasible to hide an application’s IP address using an overlay network, thereby enforcing
overlay network mediation. Secure Overlay Services (SoS) [54] is an architecture that uses
the overlay network for hiding locations. SoS uses filters combined by secret servlets to
enforce all application access being mediates through the SoS network. In the SoS archi-
tecture, access requests will be authenticated by SOAP nodes and then routed via the Chord
overlay network [86] to one of the beacon nodes and then to one of the servlets, which then
forwards the requests to the target site which is protected via filters. Figure 3.3 shows the
SoS architecture. However, the SOS architecture only simplifies the filtering roles around
the target and reduces filtering processing time. Tolerating a large scale DoS attacks (e.g.,
DDoS) still is a challenge in the SOS architecture.
• Heuristic Techniques : there are some heuristics and creative approaches in both reactive
and proactive areas against DoS attacks. Here we mention some of these approaches in
brief.
– Replicated Servers : one approach to mitigate DoS attacks against information carri-
ers is to massively replicate the content being secured around entire network. To pre-
vent access to the replicated information, an attacker must attack all replication points
throughout the entire network- a task that is considerably more difficult than attacking
a small number of, often co-located, servers. However, there are several reasons why
replication is not always an ideal solution. For instance, if the information requires
frequent updates, then it is hard to ensure large-scale coherency. Another concern is
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Figure 3.3: SoS architecture [54].
the security of the information. Also in applications such as power grid applications
this approach is not suitable due to frequent changes in control operations.
– AID Architecture [20] : Chen and Chow describe global anti-DoS services, called
AID, which ensures a registered client network the accessibility to any registered
server as long as the client does not participate in the attack. The AID service is
implemented as a distributed system consisting of a geographically dispersed AID sta-
tion, for service registration and anti-DoS operations. When a server is under attack,
it will signal its AID station, which propagates the information via the system to the
other AID stations. Each AID station enforces all clients’ traffic for the server into the
IPsec tunnels.
In summary, each DoS countermeasure has its strengths and weaknesses. It is clear that
none of the countermeasures will be the ”silver bullet” that can stop DoS attacks immediately and
efficiently. One solution can be combining the strengths of all effective solutions and let them
compensate each other’s weaknesses. Of course, this requires a general model to illustrate the
shared features of all countermeasures.
3.2.2.2 The OPL Architecture and Operation Description
The OPL is a proactive approach to prevent DoS attacks. The goal of the OPL architecture
is to make an intermediate interface by overlay nodes to hide the location of application sites
during DoS attacks. OPL allows communication only among confirmed sites. It means that
application sites have given each other a prior permission. Typically, this requires that any packet
must be authenticated through the OPL architecture before the packet is allowed to be forwarded
to the destination.
OPL is an overlay network, composed of nodes that communicate with one another atop
the underlying network substrate. In overlay networks, nodes will perform routing functionality to
deliver packets from one node in the overlay to another node of the overlay by a defined protocol.
The set of overlay nodes of the OPL architecture is known to the public and also to the attackers.
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However, certain nodes are kept secret from the public, that is certain roles that an overlay node
may assume in the architecture are kept hidden. Attackers can launch DoS attacks from variety
points of the Internet against application sites and overlay nodes. We assume that attackers cannot
penetrate inside the overlay and so they cannot send malicious packets inside the overlay. Fig-
ure 3.4 shows a high-level overview of the OPL architecture that protects application sites from
DoS attacks. In the following subsections the architecture is explained step by step.
Design Rationale
When there is no DoS attack, the application sites communicate normally via the Internet.
In this case, the overlay is not used. In case of a DoS attack against an application site, the site
switches to the overlay network. Fundamentally, the goal of the OPL architecture is to distinguish
between authorized and unauthorized traffic. The former is allowed to reach the destination, while
the latter is dropped. Hence, at a very basic level, we need the functionality of firewalls in the
network that use authentication techniques to drop malicious packets. Authentication techniques
can be solved by using traditional protocols such as IPsec, TLS, or by smart cards. Thereby
attackers cannot penetrate inside the overlay; however they can launch DoS attacks against overlay
nodes from variety points of the Internet. Although they can attack the overlay, the application
sites are immune of attacks because the overlay is the initiated defense shield.
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Any application site (e.g., application site ”A”) upon receiving a DoS attack disconnects
itself from the Internet and signals its green node, which connects the application site ”A” to the
OPL system. Only the application site knows the location of green node. Hence the IP of green
nodes is secret or the role of these nodes is kept hidden. The application site ”A” signals its green
node by a private network, while the green node communicates with overlay via the Internet. The
application site ”A” broadcasts a message via its green node to all other green nodes ”connect
to me via the overlay”. Green nodes deliver this message to their application sites. Now, any
application site that wants to communicate with the application site ”A” connects to it via the
overlay, while communicating with other (healthy) application sites via the Internet.
Green nodes These nodes are unknown nodes in the OPL architecture for the public in order
to hide the location of application sites. The role of green nodes is kept secret and hence nobody
knows which nodes are green nodes. The overlay network, along with the green nodes, holds the
location of application sites secret. In fact green nodes are reference points in the architecture. If
the green node of application site ”A” is disclosed to attackers, the architecture cannot protect the
application site ”A” from DoS attacks any more; although it can protect other application sites.
A green node, upon receiving a packet from the overlay, forwards it to the destination via
a private network. As the communication between green nodes and application sites is done by a
private network, this part of the communication is completely secure. Although green nodes are
connected to the overlay via the Internet, this part is secure too due to the secret location of green
nodes.
A remark may be made that attackers can guess the routing path and then disclose the lo-
cation of green nodes. The answer is no, because some overlay networks such as Chord, or CAN
[72] have complicated routing mechanisms that will route packets to the destination efficiently,
while utilizing a minimal amount of information about the identity of that destination. Overlay
networks have dynamic nature and high level of connectivity. In these networks unlike the un-
derlying network an edge is allowed between any pair of overlay nodes, hence overlay networks
have flexibility and several choices to select a route, which complicates the job of attackers to
determine the path taken within the overlay to a secret green node.
For having cheap private networks in any geographically zone a few green nodes are se-
lected.
Attacking the Overlay Attackers can attack simultaneously the overlay from a variety of points
of the Internet. However, these attacks have no influences on application sites. Overlay networks
can tolerate these attacks due to their dynamic nature and high level of connectivity. Since a path
exists between every pair of nodes, it is easy to recover from a breach in communication that is
the result of an attack that shuts down a subset of overlay nodes. The recovery action simply
removes those ”shut down” nodes and then the overlay reconfigures itself (update hashing and
routing tables). Furthermore, no overlay node is more important or sensitive than others.
If the overlay node that connects a green node to the overlay is attacked, it exits simply
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from the overlay and the green node randomly connects to another node of the overlay.
Some Additional Points
The OPL architecture utilizes the Chord network as an overlay network [86]. The Chord
network is a distributed protocol with N homogeneous overlay nodes that uses consistent hashing
for routing. It maps an arbitrary identifier to a unique destination node that is an active member of
the overlay by a hash function. Each overlay node maintains a list that contains O(log N) identities
of other active nodes in the overlay.
Chord network has some valuable properties:
• In a Chord network, to find a key T from any node require O(log N) steps. In fact a Chord
node only needs a small amount of routing information about other nodes.
• AChord network never partitions. It means that if attackers attack the Chord network simul-
taneously and bring down many nodes, Chord easily reconfigures itself without partitioning.
In fact Chord is able to route effectively even if only one node remains in the overlay.
• A Chord network is probably the most dependable network when compared to other overlay
networks (see Section 5.2.2 for a discussion).
Application sites are connected to the overlay via their green nodes. In fact green nodes
are bidirectional nodes that are used both for connecting to the overlay and delivering messages
to the application sites.
3.2.2.3 Performance Evaluation
In this section we analyze the performance of the OPL architecture by simulation. Our
evaluation determines the probability of successful searches and vice versa the probability of a
successful attack. A search is successful if a path between any two arbitrary application sites can
be found. Some assumptions:
• Attackers know the set of overlay nodes and can attack them.
• Attackers have a bounded and fixed amount of bandwidth to attack the architecture. For
instance, attackers can attack maximum X nodes (X < N, N is the total number of overlay
nodes) simultaneously.
• Attackers do not know which nodes are green nodes.
• Attackers cannot penetrate inside the overlay due to strong authentication techniques and
firewalls.
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• Each application site can access the overlay through access control techniques (via firewalls)
• Each geographical zone has two green nodes.
We created a simulator to evaluate the OPL architecture. To do this, we implement the
Chord (overlay) network since it is the backbone of the OPL architecture.
• Implementing the Chord network: We have implemented the Chord network in an iterative
style [86]. In the iterative style, a node resolving a lookup initiates all communications: it
asks a series of nodes for information from their hashing tables, each time moving closer on
the Chord ring to the desired successor. During each stabilization protocol step, a node up-
dates its immediate successor and one other entry in its successor list or hashing table. Thus
if a node’s successor list and hashing table contain a total of k unique entries, each entry is
refreshed once every k stabilization rounds. When the predecessor of node m changes, m
notifies its old predecessor q about the new predecessor q’. This allows q to set its successor
to q’ without waiting for the next stabilization round.
The delay of each packet is exponentially distributed with an average of 50 ms. If a node
m cannot contact another node m’ within 500 ms, m concludes that m’ has left or has been
attacked (we consider same action for both leaving node and attacked node although we
suppose different rates for these). If m’ is an entry in m’s successor list or hashing table,
this entry is removed. Otherwise m informs the node from which it learns that m’ is gone.
• Implementing the attack toolkit: Attackers are placed outside the overlay. To implement an
attack toolkit, we programmed in C++ the basic structure of Trinoo [30] to generate both
DoS and DDoS attacks. In fact we implemented two basic procedures for the attack toolkit:
daemon and master procedures. We have several daemon procedures that are controlled by
a master procedure. Daemon procedures simply send malicious traffic to the targets at the
given start time that is determined by the master procedure. We consider both static and
dynamic attacks. In a static attack, attackers select a fixed set of overlay nodes to attack and
when an attacked node is removed from the overlay, the attacker cannot redirect to another
node. In the dynamic approach, attackers can attack any node and also can redirect attacks
to other nodes.
In the first experiment we assume that the location of green nodes is never disclosed. In
this case, if at least one node of overlay is alive, the probability of successful search is one. When
all overlay nodes (100%) are dead, the probability of successful search is zero. This property
of the architecture is true due to the second property of Chord. Note that Chord will be able to
route effectively even if only one node remains in the overlay. In this case we can measure how
important the threat is. Figure 3.5 plots threat against the OPL architecture for different values of
N, the total number nodes of overlay system.
An obvious result of this figure is that resilience against DoS attacks grows linearly with
overlay network size. In other words, a large overlay network provides better DoS resilience.
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Figure 3.5: Threat against the OPL architecture.
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Figure 3.6: DoS attack in the static case.
In the next experiments we suppose that the location of green nodes may be disclosed
randomly. Attackers attack the overlay nodes randomly and maybe some of these attacked nodes
are green nodes.
The second experiment analyzes the likelihood of successful searches in the static case.
Figure 3.6(a and b) shows the probability of a successful search and probability of successful
attacks when the number of attacked nodes varies along the x-axis, respectively.
From these figures, we see that the likelihood of an attack successfully terminating com-
munication between any two arbitrary application sites is negligible unless the attacker can simul-
taneously bring down a significant fraction of nodes in the network. For instance, if an attacker
attacks 10% of overlay nodes simultaneously we have around 99% successful searches. If attack-
ers bring down between 20% and 40% of overlay nodes, around 90% successful searches exist.
Even if attackers bring down half of total nodes (50%), there are still 75% successful searches.
The third set of experiments evaluates the OPL architecture in a dynamic case. Previous
experiment assumed that an attacker would select a fixed set of nodes to attack, and that OPL takes
no action towards repairing the attack. The scenario of this set of experiments is that when OPL
identifies an attacked node, that node is removed from the overlay. When an attacker identifies
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Figure 3.7: DoS attack in the dynamic case.
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Figure 3.8: DDoS attack in the dynamic case.
that a node it is attacking no longer resides in the overlay, it redirects its attack towards a node
that does still reside in the overlay. When the attacked node is removed, the attack against that
node terminates and the node comes back to the overlay after Dr delay. Dr is a repair delay for
reconfiguration. Also, there is an attack delay, Da, that equals the difference in time between when
an attacked node is removed from the overlay to the time when the attacker (realizing the node it
is attacking has been removed) redirects the attack towards a new node in the overlay. We assume
both Da and Dr are exponentially distributed random variables with respective rates λ and µ .
We evaluate the OPL architecture in the dynamic case for both DoS and DDoS attacks.
Figure 3.7 (a and b) plots the probability of successful searches and successful attacks respectively
for DoS attack, where ρ = λ/µ varies along x-axis.
When ρ ≤ 1 for any value of overlay nodes (N), attackers are least likely ( 0%) to deny
the service. Also for large value of N (e.g. N = 1000) attackers do not have chance to deny the
service. Even when ρ is 10 and N is 100, still we have about 100% successful search. We think
in practice ρ is always less than 10. As a result, a DoS attack in the OPL architecture with repair
is solved nearly completely.
Figure 3.8 (a and b) plots the probability of successful searches and successful attackers
respectively for DDoS attack in the dynamic case. In this figure na is the maximum ability of
attackers that can attack simultaneously. In figure, the simulation is done for N = 1000.
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Figure 3.9: Impact of node joining/leaving for a) DoS and b) DDoS attacks. (X-axis: ρ; Y-axis:
percentage of absent nodes; Z-axis: probability of a successful search)
This figure shows that when an attack is distributed (DDoS), the fraction of time for which
the attack is successful can be significant when a large fraction of nodes in the overlay is attacked,
even when ρ ≤ 1. From this figure we can understand that although DDoS attack is harder to
tolerate than DoS attack, for na ≤ N/2 it can be tolerated. For instance, when na ≤ N/2 and
ρ ≤ 10 the probability of successful search is more than 70%. An interestingly note of Figure 3.8
is that when ρ is increased above 10, the curves reach steady state and remain constant. It means
that if ρ is increased to more than 100, the probability of successful attack will not change or
change unnoticeably.
The fourth set of experiment evaluates the impact of node joining/leaving on the OPL
architecture. Node joining/leavening is a normal action in overlay networks, especially in a Chord
network. Surely this action has an impact on the OPL architecture against DoS attacks. It is clear
that when more overlay nodes are absent, the resilience against DoS attacks will be worse and vice
versa. Figure 3.9 (a and b) plots a 3-D view of node joining/leaving impact on OPL for both DoS
and DDoS respectively, where the x-axis shows ρ = λ/µ , the y-axis shows the average percentage
of absent nodes of the overlay at any time and the z-axis shows probability of successful search.
As one can see from the figure, node joining/leaving has a significant impact on the OPL
performance when it is under DDoS attack. In fact the probability of successful search degrades
significantly when the percentage of absent nodes is increased in the overlay, while in the DoS
attack it is barely degraded. For instance, the probability of successful search is more than 0.9
when ρ ≤ 1 for any value of absent nodes, while for DDoS attack it is more than 0.9 only when
ρ ≤ 0.01.
The fifth set of experiments is used to analyze the impact of the number of green nodes
on the OPL architecture. In Figure 3.10, we hold N fixed at 1000. We vary the number of
green nodes along the x-axis and again plot the probability of successful search on the y-axis for
different values of na. From this figure we see that likelihood of an attack successfully terminating
communication between application sites is decreased by increasing the number of green nodes in
each zone.
The sixth experiment (Figure 3.11) shows that although a large overlay provides a better
resilience against a DoS attack, it requires more delay for routing too. In fact the delay is increased
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Figure 3.10: Impact of the number of green nodes per application on the OPL performance.
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Figure 3.11: Delay of the overlay network.
proportionally to O(logN), where N is the total number of nodes in the overlay network (Chord
property).
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3.3 Activity Support Services
The Activity Support Services currently defined comprise the CIS Protection service, and
the Access Control and Authorization service. In the next year, further services might be provided,
namely the CIS Communication service.
3.3.1 CIS Protection Service
The CRUTIAL reference architecture to protect critical infrastructures [34, 91] models the
whole infrastructure architecture as a WAN-of-LANs. This topology allows simple solutions to
hard problems such as legacy control subnetworks, and interconnection of critical and non-critical
traffic. Typically, a critical information infrastructure is formed by facilities, like power transfor-
mation substations or corporate offices, modeled as collections of LANs and interconnected by a
wider-area network, modeled as a WAN, in the WAN-of-LANs model.
This architecture allows defining realms with different levels of trustworthiness. In this
section we are interested in the problem of protecting realms from one another, i.e., a LAN from
another LAN or from the WAN. However, given the ease of defining LANs in today’s IP ar-
chitectures (e.g., through virtual switched LANs), there is virtually no restriction to the level of
granularity of protection domains, which can go down to a single host. In consequence, our model
and architecture allow us to deal both with outsider threats (protecting a facility from the Internet)
and insider threats (protecting a critical host from other hosts in the same physical facility, by
locating them in different LANs).
Protection of LANs from the WAN or other LANs is made by a device called the CIS.
A CIS provides two basic services: the Protection Service (PS) and the Communication Service
(CS). The PS ensures that the incoming and outgoing traffic in/out of the LAN satisfies the security
policy of the infrastructure. The CS supports secure communication between CIS and, ultimately,
between LANs. Although the CIS supports these two services, this section presents only the pro-
tection service, not the communication service (that is currently under development). Therefore,
from now on “the CIS” means “the CIS Protection Service”. Figure 3.12 illustrates the use of CIS
protecting several LANs of a critical infrastructure.
A CIS can not be a simple firewall since that would put the infrastructure at most at the
level of security of current Internet systems, which is not acceptable since intrusions in those
systems are constantly being reported [43, 51]. Instead, a CIS is a distributed protection device
based on a sophisticated access control model and designed with intrusion-tolerant capabilities.
3.3.1.1 Specification of the Service
At the applications point of view, the CIS works mainly like a firewall, and thus is com-
pletely transparent to the critical infrastructure applications, that does not even have know that
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Figure 3.12: WAN-of-LANs connected by CIS.
there is some kind of sophisticated protection device inspecting their communication. The CIS
captures packets, checks if they satisfy the security policy being enforced, and forwards the ap-
proved packets, discarding those that do not satisfy the policy. However, several other character-
istics of the CIS make it a unique protection device.
• Distributed firewall : CIS can be used in a distributed way, enforcing the same policies
in different points of the network. An extreme case in the SCADA/PCS side is to have a
CIS in each gateway interconnecting each substation network, and a CIS specifically pro-
tecting each critical component of the SCADA/PCS network. The concept is akin to using
firewalls to protect hosts instead of only network borders [8], and is specially useful for
critical information infrastructures given their complexity and criticality, with many routes
into the control network that can not be easily closed (e.g., Internet, dial-up modems, VPNs,
wireless access points) [14].
• Application-level firewall : Critical infrastructures have many legacy components that
were designed without security in mind, and thus do not employ security mechanisms like
access control and cryptography [33]. Since these security mechanisms are not part of the
SCADA/PCS protocols and systems, which must still be protected, protection must be de-
ployed in some point between the infrastructure and the hosts that access it. The CIS has
to inspect and evaluate the messages considering application-level semantics because, as
already said, the application (infrastructure) itself does not verify it.
• Rich access control model : Besides the capacity to inspect application-level messages,
the CIS needs to support a rich access control policy that takes into account the multi-
organizational nature of the critical infrastructures as well as their different operational
states. Taking the Power System as an example, there are several companies involved in
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generation, transmission and distribution of energy, as well as regulatory agencies, and sev-
eral of these parties can execute operations in the power grid. Moreover, almost all Power
System operation is based on a classical state model of the grid [37]. In each state of this
model, specific actions must be taken (e.g., actions defined in a defense plan, to avoid or re-
cover from a power outage) and many of these actions are not allowed in other states (e.g., a
generator can not be separated automatically when the Grid is in its normal state). These two
complex facets of access control in critical infrastructures require more elaborated models
than basic discretionary, mandatory, or role-based access control. To deal with this, in the
architecture of CRUTIAL we adopt a more elaborated model, OrBAC (Organization Based
Access Control) [4]. It allows the specification of security policies containing permissions,
prohibitions, obligations and recommendations, taking into account the role of the subject,
who is part of an organization, the action it wants to execute, the target object of this action,
and the context in which it is executed. An example: “In context ‘emergency’, operators
from company C can execute maintenance operations on device D.”
• Intrusion-tolerant firewall : The level of security of current systems connected to the
Internet is not adequate for the infrastructures we are concerned with, given their critical-
ity. To improve the security and dependability of the CIS, it is designed to be intrusion-
tolerant [90]: it is replicated in n machines and follows its specification as long as at most
f of these machines are attacked and have their behavior corrupted. Obviously, such intru-
sion tolerance is only useful if there is independence in the way machines are corrupted.
This independence of the corruptions or intrusions requires that the machines do not share
the same vulnerabilities, since an intrusion is always the result of an attack that activates
a vulnerability (or more). The usually accepted way to enforce this property is by having
diversity in the machines [58, 68]. Therefore, the intrusion-tolerant CIS is designed with
diversity in mind.
In the current stage of the project, we addressed mainly the problem of designing an
intrusion-tolerant distributed firewall and its required protocols, which are described in Section
5.3.1.
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3.3.2 Access Control and Authorization Service
Poly-organisation based access control (PolyOrBAC) handles the collaboration between
the CII organizations, while controlling whether the interactions between these organizations com-
ply with their expected behaviour. In fact, each component (organization/subsystem) of the CII
could have its own security objectives and should be able to cooperate with the other components.
Each organization contains its own resources, services, applications, operating system, objectives,
functioning and security rules, and policy. Each organization could specify its security policy ac-
cording to organization-based access control model (OrBAC) [49]. Different organizations could
have common interests, common access, common policy, etc.
As organizations are interconnected through CIS, we believe that, in order to provide a
controlled cooperation adapted to CII, each CIS regroups mechanisms to define security policy
of systems that compose each LAN (local and collaboration policies), and it also regroups mech-
anisms for collaboration: to make these LANs capable of collaboration and offering services to
each other.
PolyOrBAC uses OrBAC to specify local (as well as remote) access control policies (for
each organization) as well as (collaboration) rules implying several organizations. In this way,
the same rule, for example Permission(organization,role,activity,view,context), could concern
several internal and external accesses. On the other hand, Web Services (WS) are used to enforce
collaboration.
In the example below (see Figure 3.13), organization B offers WS1, and organization
A is interested in using WS1. This example shows the mutual negotiation of access rules for
distant services. The organization B offers the Web service WS1, and Alice from organization
”A” wishes to invocate WS1 from organization B. Since all organizations of the CII are connected
by CIS (represented by Web interfaces), each CIS must contain mechanisms to implement the
local security policy (of the organization that owns the CIS), collaboration mechanisms thanks to
Web services should also be implemented (so that the various organizations can offer services and
collaborate with each other). These policies and mechanisms must allow the authorized accesses
to the resources and prevent the unauthorized accesses (accidental or malicious ones).
3.3.2.1 A Practical Description of WP1 Scenarios
In this section, we will describe the access control activity support services. In deliverable
D4 [66], we proposed PolyOrBAC, a framework that ensures an access control specification for
involved entities/organisations in a CII. PolyOrBAC handles the collaboration between the CIIs
organisations, while controlling whether the interactions between these organizations comply with
their expected behaviour [50]. In fact, each component or subsystem of the CII has its own security
policy and should respect the global security policy and should be able to cooperate with the other
components. For this aim, on the one hand PolyOrBAC uses the OrBAC to specify local security
policies, on the other hand uses web services to handle the collaboration and resources sharing
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Figure 3.13: The general functionning.
processes.
This vision is important in the context of CRUTIAL where some components of the elec-
trical and information infrastructure execute remote actions and access to resources from other
partner organizations. The WP1 D2 deliverable illustrates this kind of accesses by presenting sev-
eral functioning scenarios occurring in emergency and normal situations (cf. WP1-D2 Section
5.2: control system scenarios) [34].
In this Section we present the final-user vision by deriving the web services [94, 93, 95,
67] corresponding to these scenarios, while in Section 5.1 we use these Web Services to present
PolyOrBAC access control protocols and thus, to enforce secure communications between CIIs.
Firstly, we study the scenario 2 (interaction between TSO and DSO operators under emer-
gency conditions). This scenario involves two different operators the TSO (Transmission system
operator) and the DSO (Distribution system operator), Then, we will apply the same methodology
over scenarios 1, 3 and 4 of section 5 of D2.
3.3.2.2 Scenario 1: DSO Tele-operation (Emergency and Normal Conditions)
This scenario considers the possible cascading effects of ICT threats to the DSO commu-
nication channels among Area Control Centres and their tele-controlled Substations in presence
of Power Contingencies, e.g. insufficient production or HV line unavailability (cf. Section 5.1
p77 D2).
This scenario considers the information flow between DSO Area Control Centers and their
supervised HV/MV Substations, in both NORMAL and EMERGENCY Distribution Grid operat-
ing conditions.
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A. Involved organisations:
We consider 2 important classes of organisations involved in the scenario 1:
• Area Control Centre (ACC) managed by the DSO.
• Substation (Contains an MCD-TU) at the level of the ACC.
B. Exchanged commands and signals:
Figure 3.14 shows the different exchanges of signals and commands between DSO ACC
and DSO SS organisations.
Figure 3.14: Scenario 1 exchanged commands.
1. DSO substations send measurements of P, Q, V and breakers positions towards DSO ACC.
2. DSO substations send alarms and status variations towards DSO ACC.
3. DSO ACC send commands to DSO substations.
4. DSO ACC updates information locally in order to align the databases and the operation
capabilities at each ACC.
C. Web Services to implement:
In this scenario, we specify the Tele-operation web service as follows:
o Provider: DSO SS.
o Client: DSO ACC.
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3.3.2.3 Scenario 2: Interaction Between TSO and DSO Operators in Emergency Conditions
This scenario considers the possible cascading effects due to ICT threats to the commu-
nication (security of the communications) channel among TSO/DSO Control Centers and MCD-
TUs in emergency conditions (under-frequency or voltage instability). It is assumed that in emer-
gency conditions the TSO is authorised by the DSO to activate defence plan actions consisting in
the performance of load shedding activities on the Distribution Grid (cf. WP1-D2 Section 5.2 p88
D2). TSO RCC monitors the Electric Power System and elaborates some potentially emergency
conditions that could be remedied with opportune load shedding commands applied to particu-
lar areas of the Grid. In order to actuate the defence action the TSO RCC chooses a subset of
HV/MV Substations (SSs) from the list of SSs participating to the emergency plan, then sends the
requests of preventively arming the MCD-TUs in these SSs to the interested DSO Area Control
Centres (DSO ACCs). These requests are delivered through a communication channel between
a TSO RCC and a DSO ACC. The DSO ACC provides for arming the required SSs, and returns
their status to the TSO RCC. In case of detection of a real emergency situation the TSO MCD-TU
(area sentinel) sends the command of load shedding to all the DSO MCD-TU participating to the
emergency plan, but only the armed ones will be actually detached.
A. Involved Organizations:
By studying this scenario, we distinguish four important classes of organisations 1 (cf.
Figure 5-14 p89 D2) involved in the scenario 2:
• Regional Control Centre (RCC) managed by the TSO.
• Substation (Contains an MCD-TU) at the level of the RCC.
• Area Control Centre (ACC) managed by the DSO.
• Substation (SS) (Contains an MCD-TU) at the level of the ACC.
B. Exchanged signals and commands:
Figure 3.15 shows the different exchanges of signals and commands between TSO RCC,
TSO SS, DSO ACC and DSO SS organisations.
1. All DSO SSs send different signals and measurements (power, voltage, frequency, etc) to
their reference ACC.
2. All TSO SSs and Power Stations send different signals and measurements (power, voltage,
frequency, etc) to their reference RCC.
1An organisation can represent a server, a machine, an ACC, an RCC, an NCC, etc.
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Figure 3.15: Scenario 2 exchanged commands.
3. DSO ACC sends different signals and measurements to TSO RCC.
4. The RCC elaborates the situation and the possible emergency manoeuvres then sends the
requests of arming a set of SSs to DSO ACCs.
Arming Step:
5. The TSO RCC orders DSO ACCs to arm the SSs concerned by the possible emergency
situation.
6. The DSO ACC sends the arming request to the involved SSs which arm their MCD-TU.
7. The DSO SSs send an acknowledgement to DSO ACC.
Then the TSO SSs send Load shedding request to the armed DSO SSs.
Load shedding step:
8. The TSO SS orders all the DSO SSs to perform the load shedding command over their
MCD-TUs. Only the previously armed DSO SSs perform the load shedding over their
MCD-TUs.
C. Web Services to implement:
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In this scenario, 3 web services can be distinguished:
Arming Request:
o Provider: DSO ACC.
o Client: an EMS at the level of the TSO RCC.
Arming Activation:
o Provider: DSO SS
o Client: a virtual user at the level of the DSO ACC.
Load Shedding Activation:
o Provider: DSO SS
o Client: a virtual user at the level of the TSO SS.
3.3.2.4 Scenario 3: Integration of DSO Operation and Maintenance Functions
This scenario explores the integration of process control and corporate networks in a DSO
Control Centre, evaluating the possible cascading effects of cyber attacks on the integrated archi-
tecture (cf. Section 5.3 p90 D2). Note that this scenario is still under development and there will
be possible evolutions in the future. Scenario 3 assumes the use of a DSO intranet to access data
for:
• Maintenance of MV and LV grids. The maintenance manager needs to know both the status
of the Grid and the availability of the maintenance personnel, in order to carry out mainte-
nance plans.
• Access to process information by other Corporate functions (administrative, management,
metering, etc.)
A. Involved organisations:
We consider 2 important classes of organisations involved in the scenario 3:
• Area Control Centre (ACC) managed by the DSO.
• Substation (Contains an MCD-TU) at the level of the ACC.
B. Exchanged commands and signals:
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Figure 3.16: Scenario 3 exchanged commands.
Figure 3.16 shows the different exchanges of signals and commands between DSO ACC
and DSO SS organisations.
1. DSO substations send metering data towards DSO ACC.
2. DSO substations send alarms and status variations towards DSO ACC.
3. DSO substations send measurements of P, Q, V and breakers positions towards DSO ACC.
4. DSO ACC or MCD-TUs send operation commands to DSO substations.
C. Web Services to implement:
In this scenario, we specify the Operation web service as follows:
o Provider: DSO SS.
o Client: DSO ACC.
3.3.2.5 Scenario 4: Maintenance of ICT Components of DSO
This scenario considers the institution of a DSO Centralized ICT maintenance service
(cf. Section 5.4 p92 D2). Note that this scenario is still under development and there will be
possible evolutions in the future. Scenario 4 assumes the presence of a central Control Center
for the monitoring and control of the components of all the ICT systems of the Power Utility, a
kind of Security Operational Center (SOC) having both Teleoperation and ICT competencies for
providing:
1. Remote ordinary maintenance activities on the ICT components in a substation, including
communication devices (e.g. routers, gateways, firewalls), Station Computers, Station level
and bay level IEDs.
2. Continuous monitoring of the ICT equipment status, including security monitoring func-
tions.
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3. Repair actions on ICT network and automation equipment configurations.
A. Involved organisations:
We should distinguish between the DSO ACC which ensures the control and the monitor-
ing, and the entity (organisation DSO- maintenance) that ensures the maintenance of all equip-
ments. The maintenance concerns all equipments (from the ICT infrastructure), belonging to the
ACC or the DSO substations.
We consider 2 important organisations involved in the scenario 4:
• The DSO-maintenance from the Area Control Centre (ACC) managed by the DSO.
• A substation (Contains an MCDTU) at the level of the ACC.
B. Exchanged commands and signals:
Figure 3.17 shows the different exchanges of signals and commands between DSO Main-
tenance and DSO SS organisations.
Figure 3.17: Scenario 4 exchanged commands.
1. DSO substations (ICT components of DSO) transmit status information to DSO ACC.
2. The DSO ACC delivers commands, and
3. Functional testing and remote operation data to ICT components of the DSO at the level of
the DSO substations.
C. Web Services to implement:
In this scenario, we specify the Maintenance web service as follows:
o Provider: DSO SS.
o Client: DSO ACC.
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3.4 Monitoring and Failure Detection
This section provides a preliminary definition of the middleware services devoted to mon-
itoring and failure detection activities. Following a top-down approach, a preliminary schemati-
zation and description of the relevant activities is presented.
3.4.1 Diagnosis Framework
From a theoretical viewpoint, the framework for the diagnosis activity involves the fol-
lowing three actors [25]: the monitored component (the system component under diagnosis), the
deviation detection mechanism (the entity introduced in the system to observe the external behav-
ior of the monitored component and to judge whether it is suitable or not) and the state diagnosis
mechanism (it has to guess the internal state of the monitored component, based on information
collected overtime from the deviation detection mechanism). Two information flows are neces-
sary: the first involves the monitored component and the deviation detection mechanism (the latter
has to observe the former), the second involves the deviation detection mechanism and the state
diagnosis mechanism (the latter has to collect information provided by the former). Each of the
above information flows could be managed following a proactive or a reactive schema: in the
proactive schema, the entity interested in fresh information has to ask for them, whilst in the reac-
tive schema the entity that generates information has to send it to the entity interested in it. More
interaction patterns can be found in [75].
When dealing with systems composed by several components at different architectural
levels, the above framework needs to be extended: several components need to be monitored and
several deviation detection mechanisms need to be in place. Given that evident or subtle depen-
dencies can exist among the component functionalities, errors observed in different components
could be correlated. All this requires the need for a correlation activity between the collection of
errors and the declaration of a diagnosis.
In fact, in large, well designed and tested systems, with hardware components far from
their wear out age, crude faults or malfunctions, easily and rapidly recognizable as such, tend to
be really rare events; while subtle borderline conditions may still occur, whose very presence is
difficult to detect, not to mention accurate recognition and treatment. Another difficulty stems
from the observation that, in the less-than-simple systems, a binary (faulty/not faulty, go/no go)
schematization of the error behavior is insufficient and possibly counter-effective on the avail-
ability. More often, in a mature system non-fatal malfunctions occur, which nevertheless require
corrective action, albeit far from downing the entire affected (sub)system. Also from this point
of view, then, finer recognition of borderline situations is needed, to enable flexible reaction. As
an example, an over-temperature signal given by a CPU sensor may trigger a de-scheduling of
low priority tasks, if the CPU is fully loaded, while it may by a symptom of worse problems if
the CPU is only lightly loaded. Even if a binary decision scheme is deemed good enough, an ap-
proach more knowledgeable than just waiting for a single, unambiguous error signal would have
a positive impact on the system dependability.
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The same idea can be extended when dealing with a complex infrastructure made up by
several sub-systems (nodes). In this case it is not practical to have a centralized diagnostic en-
tity that has to gather, aggregate and correlate all the detections collected over time from the
sub-systems; the centralized diagnostic entity should be ultra-reliable and communication links
between it and all the monitored sub-systems should be guaranteed. Therefore, methods for dis-
tributed diagnosis are mandatory, where each sub-system decides independently about the system
(e.g. which are the healthy sub-systems and which the faulty ones).
Considering a distributed system comprised by completely connected sub-systems, the
Hybrid Fault-Effect Model [96] can be assumed, so that all fault classification is based on a local
classification of fault-effects (to the extent permitted by the deviation detection mechanism of the
sub-system itself) and on a global classification, thus developing a global opinion on the fault-
effect. Diagnosis is thus performed using a two-phase approach on a concurrent, on-line and
continual basis:
1. Local detection and diagnosis, aiming to diagnose the sub-system itself.
2. Global information collection and global diagnosis, obtained through exchange of local di-
agnosis. Since each sub-system may have a different perception of the errors observed on
the remote sub-systems, each node has some private values (the results of private diagnosis
on remote sub-systems) and the goal is to ensure consistent information exchange and agree-
ment against Byzantine behavior. An agreement (or consensus) algorithm is thus needed in
order to solve the problem.
3.4.2 Diagnosis in CRUTIAL
The CRUTIAL infrastructure is organized as a WAN-of-LANs, where each LAN is con-
nected to theWAN by a CIS. Given that the computers inside the LANs cannot be modified/updated,
all the diagnosis activity has to be performed inside the CIS. The following diagnosis scenarios
arise:
• CIS self-diagnosis (local view): CIS monitors both itself (e.g. to diagnose hardware or
software faults) and its LAN (e.g to “measure” its level of trustworthiness).
• CIS distributed diagnosis (global view): CISs construct a common view about the “state”
of a certain CIS in the infrastructure (e.g. related to the liveness and trustworthiness of a
specific CIS).
3.4.2.1 The CIS Self-Diagnosis Service
From a local viewpoint the CIS is a sophisticated application level firewall (combined with
equally sophisticated intrusion detectors) which is required to:
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1. be intrusion tolerant,
2. prevent resource exhaustion providing perpetual operation,
3. be resilient against fault assumption coverage uncertainty providing survivability.
In order to comply with the above requirements, the CIS has a hybrid architecture and is
replicated (with diversity) in n replicas. Each CIS replica is built using a synchronous and secure
local wormhole and an asynchronous and insecure payload.
Two monitoring/failure detection scenarios arise:
1. Internal monitoring: monitoring performed inside a single replica, trying to detect local
failures;
2. External monitoring: monitoring performed on the perceived behavior of the other replicas.
The internal monitoring, given the information system malfunctions introduced in [66],
has to be done on the following components/services (so far, components/services that need to be
monitored were not definitely identified):
• Hardware components (e.g. network interfaces, processing units, memory modules ...)
which are supporting the replica. The monitoring activity on these components makes sense
only when physical replication is used; in case of logical replication, these components need
to be monitored in the host system running the replicas.
• Software components belonging to several architectural levels in the payload or in the oper-
ating system.
Several signals coming from many architectural levels are collected and processed over
time: an example of signal coming from low architectural levels (OS) is related to a CPU fan that
is working too slow or a temperature sensor that is signaling the CPU is too warm. An example
of signal coming from a higher architectural level is an application-generated exceptions or error
return code.
The internal monitoring activity has hence to identify compound system conditions which
could require diverse corrective actions; for example, repeated application errors could be inter-
preted as manifestation of software aging requiring rejuvenation, or could be correlated with lower
level signals (the CPU is too warm because the CPU fan is working too slow), requiring another
kind of reconfiguration (e.g. replacing the CPU fan). The rationale behind internal monitoring
and failure detection is to try to stop the replica before it starts to behave incorrectly.
The external monitoring is performed by each replica on the perceived behavior of the
other replicas, given that a replica is not guaranteed to always behave correctly. The monitoring
activity is performed at service level, so that each service is in charge of detecting whether its peers
running in the other replicas seems correct or not. An examples of middleware service monitoring
its peers on other replicas is the “Protection Service”.
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3.4.2.2 LAN Diagnosis Service
The CIS monitors over time the nodes in its protected LAN in order to evaluate their trust-
worthiness. The evaluated trustworthiness level is used to request maintenance actions on the pro-
tected un-trustable node (e.g. replacing hardware, refreshing the software, changing passwords,
...).
A trustworthiness indicator for each protected node N is defined (it could be could be
multi-dimensional) and modified based on the following detections:
• The instance of the security policy applied within the CIS itself to the outgoing traffic detects
that N is trying to violate the security policy (e.g. trying to send something without being
allowed to do it).
• the instance of the security policy running on a remote CIS detects that a message sent by
N to one of its protected node was rejected. The CIS distinguishes whether an incoming
packet really comes from a station computer (instead from an hacker in the WAN) using the
“LAN Traffic Labeling” service (the CIS protecting the source node signs the label). The
signed label is hence a proof of the source of the packet.
The LAN diagnosis service collects over time the above detections in order to evaluate the
trustworthiness indicator of each protected node. If protected trustworthiness indicator of node N
goes over a given threshold, the LAN diagnosis service alerts its peers about N being un-trustable
(so that they can possibly take adequate countermeasures).
3.4.2.3 CIS Distributed Diagnosis Service
The several replicas that made up a single CIS are required to perform the same operations;
this simplifies somewhat the task of checking their correctness on the run. Each single CIS, as
seen from the WAN, is a different logical entity, in terms of actions, services and requests toward
other CISs. In the ordinary information flux there is no simple comparison rule check that can
be performed, to catch on the fly a mischievous partner. On the other hand, if a CIS becomes
compromised, internal redundancy and resilient architecture notwithstanding, then necessarily the
basic hypothesis on the fault occurrence has been broken: more than f replicas are out of order
together. Of course, this is the catastrophic case, whose probability has to be lowered down to
a target level by choosing proper redundancy figures. However, a local catastrophe (regarding a
single LAN controlled by a compromised CIS) not necessarily should imply the downing of the
entire system. In fact, on the WAN side, all CISs attempt to maintain a common view of two
parametric descriptors its partners’ health: Liveness and Trustworthiness.
Liveness is checked in two ways: i) passively, by monitoring normal network traffic from
the target; ii) if the former is not frequent enough, exert a form of resilient ping, by means of a
simple challenge/response protocol.
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Trustworthiness is built up by checking the formal correctness of the messages coming
from the target, as well from any access violation detected by the Protection Service.
4. RUNTIME SUPPORT PROTOCOLS 53
4 Runtime Support Protocols
4.1 Proactive-Reactive Recovery Protocols
In this section we describe the protocols used to implement the proactive-reactive recovery
service presented in Section 2.1. Before describing the protocols, we start by presenting the
assumptions under which they were developed.
4.1.1 System Model
The proactive-reactive recovery protocols are executed inside the proactive-reactive re-
covery wormhole (PRRW). Note that, as explained in Section 2.1, the PRRW executes in a syn-
chronous (real-time) subsystem and it is assumed the existence of a set of services:
1. local PRRWs’ clocks have a known precision, obtained by a clock synchronization protocol;
2. there is point-to-point timed reliable communication between every pair of local wormholes;
3. there is a timed reliable broadcast primitive with bounded maximum transmission time;
4. there is a timed atomic broadcast primitive with bounded maximum transmission time.
In this context, the proactive-reactive recovery protocols are implemented as threads in a
real-time environment with a preemptive scheduler where static priorities are defined from 1 to
3 (priority 1 being the highest). The protocols algorithms do not consider explicitly the clock
skew and drift, since we assume that these deviations are small due to the periodic clock synchro-
nization, and thus are compensated in the protocol parameters (i.e., in the time bounds for the
execution of certain operations).
4.1.2 The Protocols
We developed two protocols to implement the proactive-reactive recovery service. The
protocols are presented in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2. The first protocol is responsible by the
main logic of the service, while the second one is specifically responsible by recovery subslot
allocation according to what was explained in Section 2.1.3. We start with the description of
Algorithm 1 and then Algorithm 2 is described.
Parameters and variables. Algorithm 1 uses six parameters: i, n, f , k, TP, and TD. The id of the
local wormhole is represented by i; n specifies the total number of replicas and consequently the
total number of local wormholes; f defines the maximum number of faulty replicas; k specifies
the maximum number of replicas that recover at the same time; TP defines the maximum time
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interval between consecutive triggers of the recovery procedure (depicted in Figure 2.3 - page 13);
and TD defines the worst case execution time of the recovery of a replica. Additionally, four
variables are defined: tnext stores the instant when the next periodic recovery should be triggered
by local wormhole i; the Detect set contains the processes that detected the failure of replica i; the
Suspect set contains the processes that suspect replica i of being failed; and scheduled indicates if
a reactive recovery is scheduled for replica i.
Algorithm 1 Proactive-reactive recovery service: main protocol
{Parameters}
integer i {Id of the local wormhole}
integer n {Total number of replicas}
integer f {Maximum number of faulty replicas}
integer k {Max. replicas that recover at the same
time}
integer TP {Periodic recovery period}
integer TD {Recovery duration time}
{Constants}
integer Tslot , (d fk e+1)TD {Slot duration time}
{Variables}
integer tnext = 0 {Instant of the next periodic recovery
start}
set Detect=∅ {Processes that detected me as failed}
set Suspect = ∅ {Processes suspecting me of being
failed} bool scheduled= false {Indicates if a reactive
recovery is scheduled for me}
{Reactive recovery interface threads with priority 3}
service W suspect( j)
1: send( j,〈SUSPECT〉)
service W detect( j)
2: send( j,〈DETECT〉)
upon receive( j,〈SUSPECT〉)
3: Suspect← Suspect∪{ j}
upon receive( j,〈DETECT〉)
4: Detect← Detect∪{ j}
{Periodic recovery thread with priority 1}
procedure proactive recovery()
5: synchronize global clock()
6: tnext← global clock()+(d i−1k eTslot+ d fk eTD)
7: loop
8: wait until global clock() = tnext
9: recovery()
10: tnext = tnext+TP
11: end loop
procedure recovery()
12: recovery actions()
13: Detect←∅
14: Suspect←∅
15: scheduled← false
{Reactive recovery execution threads with priority 2}
upon |Detect| ≥ f +1
16: recovery()
upon (|Detect|< f+1)∧(|Suspect∪Detect| ≥ f+1)
17: if ¬scheduled then
18: scheduled← true
19: 〈s,ss〉 ← allocate subslot()
20: if s 6= d ike then
21: wait until global clock() mod TP = sTslot+
ssTD
22: if |Suspect ∪ Detect| ≥ f + 1 then
recovery()
23: end if
24: end if
Reactive recovery service interface. W suspect( j) andW detect( j) send, respectively, a SUSPECT
or DETECT message to wormhole j, which is the wormhole in the suspected/detected node (lines
1-2). When a local wormhole i receives such a message from wormhole j, j is inserted in the
Suspect or Detect set according to the type of the message (lines 3-4). The content of these sets
may trigger a recovery procedure.
Proactive recovery. The proactive recovery() procedure is triggered by each local wormhole i
at boot time (lines 5-11). It starts by calling a routine that synchronizes the clocks of the local
wormholes with the goal of creating a virtual global clock, and blocks until all local wormholes
call it and can start at the same time. When all local wormholes are ready to start, the virtual
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global clock is initialized at (global) time instant 0 (line 5). The primitive global clock() returns
the current value of the (virtual) global clock. After the initial synchronization, the variable tnext
is initialized (line 6) in a way that local wormholes trigger periodic recoveries in groups of up
to k replicas according to their id order, and the first periodic recovery triggered by every lo-
cal wormhole is finished within TP from the initial synchronization. After this initialization, the
procedure enters an infinite loop where a periodic recovery is triggered within TP from the last
triggering (lines 7-11). The recovery() procedure (lines 12-15) starts by calling the abstract func-
tion recovery actions() (line 12) that should be implemented according to the logic of the system
using the PRRW. Typically, a recovery starts by saving the state of the local replica if it exists,
then the payload operating system (OS) is shutdown and its code is restored from some read-only
medium, and finally the OS is booted, bringing the replica to a supposedly correct state. The last
three lines of the recovery() procedure re-initialize some variables because the replica should now
be correct (lines 13-15).
Reactive recovery. Reactive recoveries can be triggered in two ways: (1) if the local wormhole i
receives at least f +1 DETECT messages, then recovery is initiated immediately because replica i
is accounted as one of the f faulty replicas (line 16); (2) otherwise, if f +1 DETECT or SUSPECT
messages arrive, then replica i is at best suspected of being failed by one correct replica. In both
cases, the f + 1 bound ensures that at least one correct replica detected a problem with replica
i. In the suspect scenario, recovery does not have to be started immediately because the replica
might not be failed. Instead, if no reactive recovery is already scheduled (line 17), the aperiodic
task finds the closest slot where the replica can be recovered without endangering the availability
of the replicated system. The idea is to allocate one of the (reactive) recovery subslots depicted in
Figure 2.3. This is done through the function allocate subslot() (line 19 – explained later). Notice
that if the calculated subslot 〈s,ss〉 is located in the slot where the replica will be proactively
recovered, i.e., if s = d ike, then the replica does not need to be reactively recovered (line 20). If
this is not the case, then local wormhole i waits for the allocated subslot and then recovers the
corresponding replica (lines 21-22). Notice that the expression global clock() mod TP returns the
time elapsed since the beginning of the current period, i.e., the position of the current global time
instant in terms of the time diagram presented in Figure 2.3 - page 13.
Recovery subslot allocation. Subslot management is based on accessing a data structure repli-
cated in all wormholes through a timed total order broadcast protocol, as described in Algorithm 2.
This algorithm uses one more parameter and one more variable besides the ones defined in Al-
gorithm 1. The parameter T∆ specifies the upper-bound on the delivery time of a message sent
through the synchronous control network connecting all the local wormholes. Variable Subslot
is a table that stores the number of replicas (up to k) scheduled to recover at each subslot of a
recovery slot, i.e., Subslot[〈s,ss〉] gives the number of processes using subslot ss of slot s (for a
maximum of k). This variable is used to keep the subslot occupation, allowing the local wormholes
to find the next available slot when it is necessary to recover a suspected replica.
A subslot is allocated by local wormhole i through the invocation of allocate subslot(),
which timestamps and sends an ALLOC message using total order multicast (line 1) to all local
wormholes and waits until this message is received (line 2). At this point, local allocate subslot()
is called and the next available subslot is allocated to the replica (line 3). The combination
of total order multicast with the sending timestamp Tsend ensures that all local wormholes allo-
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Algorithm 2 Proactive-reactive recovery service: slot allocation protocol.
{Parameters (besides the ones defined in Algorithm 1)}
integer T∆ {Bound on message delivery time}
{Variables (besides the ones defined in Algorithm 1)}
table Subslot[〈1,1〉...〈d nk e,d fk e〉] = 0 {Number of processes scheduled to recover at each subslot of a re-
covery slot}
procedure allocate subslot()
1: TO-multicast(〈ALLOC, i,global clock()〉)
2: wait until TO-receive(〈ALLOC, i, tsend〉)
3: return local allocate subslot(tsend)
upon TO-receive(〈ALLOC, j, tsend〉)∧ j 6= i
4: local allocate subslot(tsend)
procedure local allocate subslot(tsend)
5: tround← (tsend +T∆) mod TP
6: curr subslot ← 〈b troundTslot c+ 1,btround mod Tslotc+
1〉
7: loop
8: curr subslot← next subslot(curr subslot)
9: if Subslot[curr subslot]< k then
10: Subslot[curr subslot] ←
Subslot[curr subslot]+1
11: return curr subslot
12: end if
13: end loop
procedure next subslot(〈s,ss〉)
14: if ss< d fk e then
15: ss← ss+1
16: else if s< dnk e then
17: ss← 0; s← s+1
18: else
19: ss← 0; s← 0
20: end if
21: return 〈s,ss〉
upon (tround← (global clock() mod TP)) mod Tslot =
0
22: if b troundTslot c= 0 then
23: prev slot← d nk e
24: else
25: prev slot← b troundTslot c
26: end if
27: ∀p,Subslot[〈prev slot,p〉]← 0
cate the same subslots in the same order. The local allocation algorithm is implemented by the
local allocate subslot(Tsend) function (lines 5-13). This function manages the various recovery
subslots and assigns them to the replicas that request to be recovered. It starts by calculating the
first subslot that may be used for a recovery according to the latest global time instant when the
ALLOC message may be received by any local wormhole (lines 5-6), then it searches and allo-
cates the next available subslot, i.e., a slot in the future that has less than k recoveries already
scheduled (lines 7-21). Finally, in the beginning of each recovery slot, all the subslots of the
previous recovery slot are deallocated (lines 22-27).
5. MIDDLEWARE SERVICES PROTOCOLS 57
5 Middleware Services Protocols
The Middleware Services Protocols chapter presents the protocols that are being used to
implement our intrusion-tolerant middleware. They include the standard protocols which are ab-
stracted by the Multipoint Network, and the protocols specifically designed for the Communica-
tion and Activity Support, and Monitoring and Failure Detection.
5.1 Multipoint Network
The services provided by the Multipoint Network layer were already described in Section
3.1. The basic service is the provision of secure channels, which support the secure communica-
tion among two peers. These channels essentially enforce a set of attributes of the communication.
The attributes that are relevant from a security point of view, are the following: authenticity, in-
tegrity, confidentiality, and reliability. In what follows we describe each of these attributes, how
they are enforced and by which protocol (e.g., IP, IPsec, TCP or SSL/TLS).
Suppose a secure channel connects two peers P and Q. Authenticity is the measure in
which what Q receives was sent by P. Authenticity means protection from forgery and is obtained
by authentication mechanisms. There are two relevant kinds of authentication for this layer: uni-
lateral - P authenticates Q or vice-versa, but not both; bilateral - P authenticates Q and vice-versa.
When a secure channel is established, authentication can be done using a passwords or a public-
private key pair. For instance, in SSL/TLS, one of the peers (unilateral authentication), or both
(bilateral authentication), sends to the other a certificate signed by a Certification Authority with
its public key, plus some data signed with its private key. Using this information the other peer,
say Q, can verify if P is who it says it is. During the communication, the messages have also to be
authenticated. An obvious solution is for P to sign all the messages it sends to Q with its private
key. However, public-key cryptography is usually slow, so messages are typically authenticated
using a keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code, or HMAC, like HMAC-SHA1 [55]. To use
this scheme, during the establishment of the connection between P and Q, a shared key is estab-
lished (for instance, P generates the key and sends it encrypted with Q’s public key, so only Q can
decrypt it). Then each message takes an HMAC, which is basically a cryptographic hash of the
message concatenated with the shared key. The message can not be forged without the possession
of the key.
Integrity means that a message sent by P can not be modified without Q detecting this
modification. Integrity is usually enforced using an HMAC, just like described. Both IPSec and
SSL/TLS use this scheme.
Confidentiality means that onlyQ can read the messages sent by P on the channel that con-
nects both. Confidentiality can be enforced by encrypting the communication using a symmetric
cryptography algorithm, like AES or IDEA. For this to be possible, P and Q need to share a key,
which is often obtained during the connection establishment, as described above.
Reliability means that a message sent by P is eventually delivered to Q. This attribute is
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related to integrity since modifications to messages have to be detected to ensure that the message
delivered is the message sent. However, detection is not enough, there is also the need to retransmit
the message when the message is discarded, either because it was corrupted or because it was lost
in the network. After having a scheme to enforce the integrity of the communication, the problem
of ensuring the reliability in a system prone to security problems is identical to the problem of
ensuring the reliability when only accidental corruptions or losses occur. The most common
solution is based on the idea of Q confirming the messages it receives from P, and P resending the
messages for which it did not receive a confirmation after a certain timeout. Reliability is provided
by SSL/TLS, which in fact are modifications of TCP that ensures reliability in systems prone only
to accidental faults. IPSec does not provide reliability, but TCP over IPSec does.
5. MIDDLEWARE SERVICES PROTOCOLS 59
5.2 Communication Support
This section presents the protocols developed to implement the RITAS services and the
overlay network protection.
5.2.1 Randomized Intrusion-Tolerant Protocols
The RITAS protocol stack, depicted in Figure 5.1, provides a set of useful distributed sys-
tem services. The stack is organized in the following way: At the bottom there are two broadcast
primitives: echo broadcast and reliable broadcast. On top of the broadcast primitives is the most
basic flavor of consensus: binary consensus. This is the only randomized protocol in the stack. On
top of binary consensus there is the multi-valued consensus protocol, which allows the proposal
of arbitrary values. Finally, at the top of the stack there are two protocols: vector consensus, and
atomic broadcast. Each one of these protocols is thoroughly described in the next subsections.
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Figure 5.1: The RITAS protocol stack.
5.2.1.1 System Model
The system is composed by a group of n processes P= {p0, p1, ...pn−1}. Group member-
ship is assumed to be static, i.e., the group is predefined and there cannot be joins or leaves during
the system operation.
There are no constrains on the kind of faults that can occur in the system. This class of
unconstrained faults is usually called arbitrary or Byzantine. Processes are said to be correct if
they do not fail, i.e., if they follow their protocol until termination. Processes that fail are said
to be corrupt. No assumptions are made about the behavior of corrupt processes – they can, for
instance, stop executing, omit messages, send invalid messages either alone or in collusion with
other corrupt processes. It is assumed that at most f = bn−13 c processes can be corrupt for total
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number of n processes.
The system is assumed to be completely asynchronous. There are no assumptions whatso-
ever about bounds on processing times or communications delays.
Each pair of processes (pi, p j) shares a secret key si j. It is out of the scope of this work
to present a solution for distributing these keys, but it may require a trusted dealer or some kind
of key distribution protocol based on public-key cryptography. Nevertheless, this is normally
performed before the execution of the protocols and does not interfere with their performance.
Each process has access to a random bit generator that returns unbiased bits observable
only by the process (if the process is correct).
Some protocols use a cryptographic hash function H(m) that maps an arbitrarily length
input m into a fixed length output. We assume that it is impossible (1) to find two values m 6= m′
such that H(m) =H(m′), and, (2) given a certain output, to find an input that produces that output.
The output of the function is often called a hash.
All the described protocols preserve their correctness under the presence of an adversary
with complete control of the network scheduling, having the power to decide the timing and the
order by which the messages are delivered to the processes. Despite this, the presence of such
an adversary is not very realistic in practice since a malicious attacker who has the power to
control the network scheduling usually has the power to perform much more severe damage such
as halting the communication between the processes altogether.
5.2.1.2 Reliable Channels
All protocols in the stack rely on a authenticated reliable channel primitive, which can
be implemented by the two layers at the bottom of Figure 5.1. These layers correspond to two
standard Internet protocols that are abstracted by the MN (not shown in the figure): the IPSec AH
protocol and TCP.
The channel primitive provides a point-to-point communication channel between a pair of
correct processes with two properties: reliability and integrity. Reliability means that messages
are eventually received, and integrity says that messages are not modified in the channel.
Formally, such a channel follows two properties:
• RC1 Reliability : If processes pi and p j are correct and pi sends a message m to p j, then p j
eventually receives m.
• RC2 Integrity : If pi and p j are correct and p j receives a message m with sender(m) = pi,
then m was sent by pi and m was not modified in the channel.1
1The predicate sender(m) returns the process identifier of the sender of message m.
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The primitive provided by the MN is called RC Broadcast(m), and it allows the broadcast-
ing of a message m to all processes. In practice this is done by sending m to each channel that
connects to any other process.
5.2.1.3 Reliable Broadcast
The reliable broadcast protocol ensures that all correct processes eventually receive the
same set of messages. No constrains are placed on the relative delivery order of messages.
It is defined formally as follows:
• RB1 Validity : If a correct process pi broadcasts a message m, then pi eventually delivers
m.
• RB2 Agreement : If a correct process pi delivers a message m, then all correct processes
eventually deliver m.
• RB3 Integrity : For any message m, every correct process delivers m at most once, and only
if m was previously broadcasted by sender(m).
These properties basically ensure that all correct processes deliver the same messages, and
that, upon a broadcast, if the sender is correct, then the message is eventually delivered by all
correct processes. In the case the sender is corrupt, the protocol guarantees that either all correct
processes deliver the same message, or no message is delivered at all.
The implemented reliable broadcast protocol was originally proposed in [12], and it is
presented in Algorithm 3. An instance of the protocol, identified by rbid, starts with the sender
broadcasting a message (INITIAL, m, rbid) to all processes. Upon receiving this message a pro-
cess sends a (ECHO,m, rbid) message to all processes. It then waits for at least bn+ f2 c+1 (ECHO,
m, rbid) messages or f +1 (READY, m, rbid) messages, and then it transmits a (READY, m, rbid)
message to all processes. Finally, a process waits for 2 f +1 (READY,m, rbid) messages to deliver
m. The broadcasts inside the protocol are made via the reliable channels.
5.2.1.4 Echo Broadcast
The echo broadcast protocol is a weaker and more efficient version of reliable broadcast.
Its properties are somewhat similar, however, it does not guarantee that all correct processes de-
liver a broadcasted message if the sender is corrupt [88]. In this case, the protocol only ensures
that the subset of correct processes that deliver will do it for the same message.
Formally, we define echo broadcast with the following properties:
• EB1 Validity : If a correct process pi broadcasts a message m, then pi eventually delivers m.
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Algorithm 3 Reliable Broadcast protocol (for process pi).
Function R Broadcast (vi, rbid)
INITIALIZATION:
1: activate task (T0); {sender only}
2: activate task (T1);
TASK T0 (SENDER ONLY):
1: RC Broadcast ( 〈INITIAL, vi, rbid〉 );
TASK T1:
1: wait until have been delivered at least one 〈INITIAL, v, rbid〉 or n+ f2 〈ECHO, v, rbid〉 or
f +1 〈READY, v, rbid〉) messages;
2: RC Broadcast ( 〈ECHO, v, rbid〉 );
3: wait until have been delivered at least n+ f2 〈ECHO, v, rbid〉 or f +1 〈READY, v, rbid〉 mes-
sages;
4: RC Broadcast ( 〈READY, v, rbid〉 );
5: wait until have been delivered at least 2 f +1 〈READY, v, rbid〉 messages;
6: return v;
• EB2 Agreement 1 : If the sender is correct and a correct process pi delivers a message m,
then all correct processes eventually deliver m.
• EB3 Agreement 2 : If the sender is corrupt and a correct process pi delivers a message m,
then no correct process delivers m′ 6= m.
• EB4 Integrity : For any message m, every correct process delivers m at most once, and only
if m was previously broadcasted by sender(m).
The implemented echo broadcast primitive was originally proposed in [88], and is a variant
of the previously described reliable broadcast protocol. It is presented in Algorithm 4.
The protocol is essentially the described reliable broadcast algorithm with the last com-
munication step omitted. An instance of the protocol identified by ebid is started with the sender
broadcasting a message (INITIAL, m) to all processes. When a process receives this message, it
broadcasts a (ECHO, m) message to all processes. It then waits for more than n+ f2 (ECHO, m)
messages to accept and deliver m. The broadcasts inside the protocol are made using the reliable
channels.
5.2.1.5 Binary Consensus
A binary consensus allows correct processes to agree on a binary value. Each process pi
proposes a value vi ∈ {0,1} and then all correct processes decide on the same value b ∈ {0,1}. In
addition, if all correct processes propose the same value v, then the decision must be v.
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Algorithm 4 Echo Broadcast protocol (for process pi).
Function E Broadcast (vi, ebid)
INITIALIZATION:
1: activate task (T0); {sender only}
2: activate task (T1);
TASK T0 (SENDER ONLY):
1: RC Broadcast ( 〈INITIAL, vi, rbid〉 );
TASK T1:
1: wait until have been delivered at least one 〈INITIAL, v, rbid〉 or n+ f2 〈ECHO, v, rbid〉
2: RC Broadcast ( 〈ECHO, v, rbid〉 );
3: wait until have been delivered at least 2 f +1 〈ECHO, v, rbid〉
4: return v;
Binary consensus is formally defined by the following properties:
• BC1 Validity : If all correct processes propose the same value b, then any correct process
that decides, decides b.
• BC2 Agreement : No two correct processes decide differently.
• BC3a Termination : Every correct process eventually decides.
Given the FLP impossibility result, there is no deterministic algorithm that can guarantee
the termination property of consensus in our system model, which is completely asynchronous.
The solution is to resort to a randomized model that guarantees the termination in a probabilistic
way (as opposed to a deterministic way). As such, the termination property is changed to the
following:
• BC3 Termination : Every correct process eventually decides with probability 1.
The implemented protocol is adapted from a randomized algorithm previously presented
in [12]. The protocol has an expected number of communication steps for a decision of 2n− f , and
uses the underlying reliable broadcast as the basic communication primitive. The main advantage
of this algorithm is that is does not use any cryptography whatsoever (although its dependence on
a reliable communication channel, in practice, implies the use of a relatively cheap cryptographic
hash function of some sort).
The protocol, which is presented in Algorithm 5, proceeds in 3-step rounds, running as
many rounds as necessary for a decision to be reached. The first step (lines 2-9) of an execution
of the protocol identified by bcid starts when each process pi (reliably) broadcasts its proposal vi.
Then waits for n− f valid messages and changes vi to reflect the majority of the received values.
In the second step (lines 10-17), pi broadcasts vi, waits for the arrival of n− f valid messages, and
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Algorithm 5 Binary Consensus protocol (for process pi).
Function B Consensus (vi, bcid)
1: repeat
2: R Broadcast ( 〈S1, vi, bcid, i〉 );
3: wait until ((n− f ) valid S1 messages have been delivered);
4: ∀ j: if (〈S1, v j, bcid, j〉 has been delivered) then Vi[j]← v j; else Vi[j]←⊥;
5: if (#1(Vi) ≥ dn− f2 e) then
6: vi← 1;
7: else
8: vi← 0;
9: end if
10: R Broadcast ( 〈S2, vi, bcid, i〉 );
11: wait until ((n− f ) valid S2 messages have been delivered);
12: ∀ j: if (〈S2, v j, bcid, j〉 has been delivered) then Vi[j]← v j; else Vi[j]←⊥;
13: if (∃v : v 6=⊥ and #v(Vi) > n2 ) then
14: vi← v;
15: else
16: vi←⊥;
17: end if
18: R Broadcast ( 〈S3, vi, bcid, i〉 );
19: wait until ((n− f ) valid S3 messages have been delivered);
20: ∀ j: if (〈S3, v j, bcid, j〉 has been delivered) then Vi[j]← v j; else Vi[j]←⊥;
21: if (∃v : #v(Vi) > 2 f +1) then
22: return v;
23: else if (∃v : #v(Vi) > f +1) then
24: vi← v;
25: else
26: vi← 1 or 0 with probability 12 ;
27: end if
28: until
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if more than half of the received values are equal, vi is set to that value; otherwise vi is set to the
undefined value ⊥. Finally, in the third step (lines 18-27), pi broadcasts vi, waits for n− f valid
messages, and decides if at least 2 f +1 messages have the same value v 6=⊥. Otherwise, if at least
f +1 messages have the same value v 6=⊥, then vi is set to v and a new round is initiated. If none
of the above conditions apply, then vi is set to a random bit with value 1 or 0, with probability 12 ,
and a new round is initiated.
The validation of the messages is performed as follows. A message received in the first
step of the first round is always considered valid. A message received in any other step k, for
k > 1, is valid if its value is congruent with any subset of n− f values accepted at step k− 1.
Suppose that process pi receives n− f messages at step 1, where the majority has value 1. Then at
step 2, it receives a message with value 0 from process p j. Remember that the message a process
p j broadcasts at step 2 is the majority value of the messages received by it at step 1. That message
cannot be considered valid by pi since value 0 could never be derived by a correct process p j
that received the same n− f messages at step 1 as process pi. If process p j is correct, then pi
will eventually receive the necessary messages for step 1, which will enable it to form a subset of
n− f messages that validate the message with value 0. This validation technique has the effect of
causing the processes that do not follow the protocol to be ignored.
5.2.1.6 Multi-valued Consensus
The multi-valued consensus builds on top of the binary consensus protocol. It allows
for processes to propose and decide on values with an arbitrary domain V . Depending on the
proposals, the decision is either one of the proposed values or a default value ⊥/∈ V .
Formally, it is defined as follows:
• MVC1Validity 1 : If all correct processes propose the same value v, then any correct process
that decides, decides v.
• MVC2 Validity 2 : If a correct process decides v, then v was proposed by some process or
v=⊥.
• MVC3Validity 3 : If a value v is proposed only by corrupt processes, then no correct process
that decides, decides v.
• MVC4 Agreement : No two correct processes decide differently.
• MVC5 Termination : Every correct process eventually decides.
The implemented protocol is adapted from the multi-valued consensus proposed in [24].
It uses the services of the underlying reliable broadcast, echo broadcast, and binary consensus
layers. The main difference from the original protocol is the use of echo broadcast instead of
reliable broadcast at a specific point, and a simplification of the validation of the vectors used
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Algorithm 6Multi-valued Consensus protocol (for process pi).
Function M V Consensus (vi, cid)
1: R Broadcast ( 〈INIT, vi, cid, i〉 );
2: wait until (at least (n− f ) INIT messages have been delivered);
3: ∀ j: if (〈INIT, v j, cid, j〉 has been delivered) then Vi[j]← v j; else Vi[j]←⊥;
4: if (∃1v : #v(Vi) ≥ (n−2 f )) then
5: wi← v;
6: else
7: wi←⊥;
8: end if
9: E Broadcast ( 〈VECT, wi, Vi, cid, i〉 );
10: wait until (at least (n− f ) valid messages 〈VECT, w j, V j, cid, j〉 have been delivered);
11: ∀ j: if (〈VECT, w j, V j, cid, j〉 has been delivered) thenWi[j]←w j; elseWi[j]←⊥;
12: if (∀ j,k Wi[j] 6= Wi[k]⇒Wi[j] = ⊥ or Wi[k] = ⊥) and (∃w: #w(Wi) ≥ (n−2 f )) then
13: bi← 1;
14: else
15: bi← 0;
16: end if
17: ci← B Consensus(bi, cid);
18: if (ci = 0) then
19: return ⊥;
20: end if
21: wait until (at least (n− 2 f ) valid messages 〈VECT, v j, V j, cid, j〉 with v j = v have been
delivered);
22: return v;
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to justify the proposed values. These changes grant greater efficiency to the protocol without
compromising its correctness. The protocol is presented in Algorithm 6.
The protocol starts when every process pi announces its proposal value vi by reliably
broadcasting a (INIT, vi) message (line 1). The processes then wait for the reception of n− f
INIT messages and store the received values in a vectorVi (lines 2-3). If a process receives at least
n− 2 f messages with the same value v, it echo-broadcasts a (VECT, v, Vi) message containing
this value together with the vector Vi that justifies the value; otherwise, it echo-broadcasts the
default value ⊥ that does not require justification (lines 4-9). The next step is to wait for the
reception of n− f valid VECT messages (line 10). A VECT message, received from process p j,
and containing vectorVj, is considered valid if one of two conditions hold: (a) v=⊥; (b) there are
at least n− 2 f elements Vi[k] ∈ V such that Vi[k] = Vj[k] = v j. If a process does not receive two
valid VECT messages with different values, and it received at least n−2 f valid VECT messages
with the same value, it proposes 1 for an execution of the binary consensus, otherwise it proposes
0 (lines 11-16). If the binary consensus returns 0, the process decides on the default value ⊥. If
the binary consensus returns 1, the process waits until it receives n−2 f valid VECT messages (if
it has not done so) with the same value v and then it decides on that value (lines 17-22).
5.2.1.7 Vector Consensus
Vector consensus allows processes to agree on a vector with a subset of the proposed
values. It ensures that every correct process decides on the same vector V of size n; if a process pi
is correct, then the vector element V [i] is either the value proposed by pi or the default value ⊥,
and at least f +1 elements of V were proposed by correct processes.
This problem is adapted from the problem of interactive consistency, defined for syn-
chronous systems, to asynchronous systems [71]. While in interactive consistency the problem
requires that the decision vector is composed by the values proposed by all correct processes, in
vector consensus the requirement is that the decision vector is formed by a majority of values
proposed by correct processes.
Vector consensus is formally defined by the following properties:
• VC1 Vector Validity : Every correct process that decides, decides on a vector V of size n:
– ∀pi: if pi is correct, then either V [i] is the value proposed by pi or ⊥.
– at least ( f +1) elements of V were proposed by correct processes.
• VC2 Agreement : No two correct processes decide differently.
• VC3 Termination : Every correct process eventually decides.
The implemented protocol is the one described in [24], which uses reliable broadcast and
multi-valued consensus as underlying primitives. The protocol, which is presented in Algorithm 7,
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starts by reliably broadcasting a message containing the proposed value by the process and setting
the round number ri to 0. The protocol then proceeds in up to f rounds until a decision is reached.
Each round proceeds as follows. A process waits until n− f + ri messages have been received
and constructs a vectorWi of size n with the received values. The indexes of the vector for which
a message has not been received have the value ⊥. The vector Wi is proposed as input for the
multi-valued consensus. If it decides on a value Vi 6=⊥, then the process decides Vi. Otherwise,
the round number ri is incremented and a new round is initiated.
Algorithm 7 Vector Consensus protocol (for process pi).
Function Vector Consensus (vi, vcid)
1: ri← 0; {round number}
2: R Broadcast ( 〈VC INIT, vi, vcid, i〉 );
3: repeat
4: wait until (at least (n− f + ri) VC INIT messages have been delivered);
5: ∀ j: if ( 〈VC INIT, v j, vcid, j〉 has been delivered) thenWi[j]← v j; elseWi[j]←⊥;
6: Vi← M V Consensus (Wi, (vcid,ri));
7: ri← ri + 1;
8: until (Vi 6= ⊥);
9: return Vi;
5.2.1.8 Atomic Broadcast
The atomic broadcast protocol delivers messages in the same order to all processes and it
is on the genesis of many important distributed system services. One can see atomic broadcast as
a reliable broadcast protocol plus the total order property.
Formally, atomic broadcast is defined by the following set of properties:
• AB1 Validity : If a correct process broadcasts a message m, then some correct process
eventually delivers m.
• AB2 Agreement : If a correct process delivers a message m, then all correct processes
eventually deliver m.
• AB3 Integrity : For any identifier ID, every correct process p delivers at most one message
m with identifier ID, and if sender(m) is correct then m was previously broadcasted by
sender(m).
• AB4 Total order : If two correct processes deliver two messages m1 and m2, then both
processes deliver the two messages in the same order.
The implemented protocol was adapted from a proposal in [24]. The main difference
from the original protocol is that it has been adapted to use multi-valued consensus instead of
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vector consensus and to utilize message identifiers for the agreement task instead of cryptographic
hashes. These changes were made for efficiency and have been proved not to compromise the
correctness of the protocol. The protocol uses reliable broadcast and multi-valued consensus as
primitives.
Algorithm 8 Atomic Broadcast protocol (for process pi).
INITIALIZATION:
1: R deliveredi← /0; {messages delivered by the reliable broadcast protocol}
2: A deliveredi← /0; {messages delivered by the atomic broadcast protocol}
3: aidi← 0; {atomic broadcast identifier}
4: numi← 0; {message number}
5: ∀ j: B[j]← 0; {window start}
6: activate task (T1,T2);
WHEN Procedure A Broadcast (m) is called DO
7: R Broadcast ( 〈A MSG, numi, m, i〉 );
8: numi← numi + 1;
TASK T1:
9: upon R deliveredi 6= /0
10: Vi←{IDs (j, num j) of the messages in R deliveredi where B[j] ≤ num j < L};
11: R Broadcast ( 〈A VECT, Vi, aidi, i〉 );
12: wait until (n− f or more 〈A VECT, V j, aidi, j〉 messages have been delivered);
13: Wi← IDs (j, num j) that appear in f +1 or more vectors V j and B[j] ≤ num j < L;
14: W←M V Consensus(Wi, aidi);
15: wait until (all messages with IDs in W are in R deliveredi);
16: Atomically deliver messages with IDs in W in a deterministic order;
17: A delivered←A delivered ⋃W;
18: while message with ID (j, B[j]) ∈ A deliveredi do
19: B[j]←B[j] + 1;
20: end while
21: aidi← aidi + 1;
22: end upon
TASK T2:
23: upon 〈A MSG, num j, m, j〉 is delivered by the reliable broadcast protocol
24: R deliveredi←R deliveredi ⋃ {〈A MSG, num j, m, j〉};
25: end upon
The atomic broadcast protocol, presented in Algorithm 8, is conceptually divided in two
tasks: (1) the broadcasting of messages, and (2) the agreement over which messages should be
delivered.
When a process pi wishes to broadcast a message m, it simply uses the reliable broadcast
to send a (A MSG, i, rbid, m) message where rbid is a local identifier for the message (lines 7-8).
Every message in the system can be uniquely identified by the tuple (i, rbid).
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The agreement task (2) is performed in rounds. A process pi starts by waiting for A MSG
messages to arrive. When such a message arrives, pi constructs a vector Vi with the identifiers
of the received A MSG messages and reliable broadcasts a (AB VECT, i, r, Vi) message, where
r is the round for which the message is to be processed (lines 10-11). It then waits for n− f
AB VECT messages (and the corresponding Vj vectors) to be delivered and constructs a new
vectorWi with the identifiers that appear in f +1 or more Vj vectors (lines 12-13). The vectorWi
is then proposed as input to the multi-valued consensus protocol and if the decided valueW is not
⊥, then the messages with their identifiers in the vectorW can be deterministically delivered by
the process (lines 14-16).
The protocol applies a window of messages to be delivered. Its purpose is to impose a
limit on the identifiers that can be proposed to the multi-valued consensus primitive (line 14). This
serves to ensure that processes will not indefinitely propose more identifiers while the messages
with the identifiers within the window are not delivered by the atomic broadcast protocol. The
variable B j indicates the beginning of the window for process j and L is the window size. So, for
example, if B j = 10 and L = 50, task T2 will only consider reaching agreement on the order of
messages whose identifier ( j,num) has 10≤ num< 50.
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5.2.2 Overlay Network Protocols
An overlay network is an attractive and cheap way to share resources and to increase
computing power. In the last few years, overlay networks have rapidly evolved and emerged as
a promising platform to deploy new applications and services in the internet. The main reasons
for this is that overlay networks are self-organizing, have a decentralized nature, good scalability,
efficient query search, and good resilience in the presence of node failures [3, 64]. However one
of the main challenges of these systems is malicious faults (attacks) [26].
This section studies overlay network protocols and qualitatively analyzes the dependability
of overlay protocols with reference to the following properties: scalability, reliability, security,
availability and integrity.
5.2.2.1 Overlay Network Protocols
Four types overlay protocols are distinguished based on their degree of decentralization,
topology, and routing mechanism of query search.
Type I - Purely unstructured decentralized : This overlay protocol is a distributed system
without any centralized control. In such systems all nodes are equivalent in functionality, named
servent (SERVer + cliENT). This means all nodes of a P2P system can act at the same time as
server as well as a client. The logical P2P topology in these systems is often an unstructured
mesh. The query is executed hop-by-hop through the mesh till success/failure or timeout. An
example of these systems is Gnutella [19].
 
Query           
 Query Respond        
Figure 5.2: Flooding search in Type I protocols.
The routing algorithm of purely unstructured systems like Gnutella use flooding broadcast
of queries for routing. In these systems each query from a peer is flooded (broadcasted) to directly
connected peers, which themselves flood their peers and etc., until the request is answered or a
maximum number of flooding steps occurs. In order to avoid loops, the nodes use the unique
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Figure 5.3: Chord routing algorithm.
message identifiers to detect and drop duplicated messages. When the resource is found in a
certain node, it initiates a direct out-of-network for downloading, establishing a direct connection
between the source and target node (see Figure 5.2).
Type II - Purely structured decentralized : They are similar to overlay networks of type I
with the difference that the logical P2P topology is a structured topology such as a mesh, a ring,
a d-dimension torus or a butterfly. These structured topologies are usually constructed using dis-
tributed hashing tables (DHT) techniques. The query is also executed hop-by-hop through the
structured topology, and is sure to be successful after a deterministic number of hops in ideal case.
Examples of this system are Chord [86], CAN [72], and Pastry [76].
The routing algorithm in these systems adds structure to the way information about re-
sources are stored using distributed hash tables. With this method the queries can be efficiently
routed to the node with the desired resource. This method also reduces the number of hops that
must be taken to locate a resource. Among examples of these systems we have chosen the Chord
routing algorithm (see Figure 5.3).
Type III - Hybrid centralized indexing : In these systems there is a central server that main-
tains information about registered users to the network. Each arriving node needs to actively notify
the server, then other nodes only need to search peer’s address at the server about its wanted ob-
jects. There is end-to-end interaction between two peer clients. Napster is an example of these
systems [1].
In these systems a peer connects to a centralized directory server, which stores all infor-
mation regarding location and usage of resources. Upon request from a peer, the central index will
match the request with the best peer in its directory that matches the request. The best peer could
be the one that is cheapest, fastest, nearest, or most available, depending on the user needs. Then
the data exchange will occur directly between the two peers. Napster uses this method. Figure 5.4
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Figure 5.4: Routing algorithm in Napster.
shows routing in Napster as an example of these systems.
Type IV - Hybrid decentralized indexing : In these systems some nodes, called super-nodes,
are central servers and they register users to the system and also facilitate the peer discovery
process. In such systems peers are automatically elected to become super-nodes if they have
sufficient bandwidth and good processing power. Like systems of type III there is end-to-end
interaction (data exchange) between two peer clients. Figure 5.5 shows these systems. Kazaa
[65] and Morpheus [98] are two decentralized indexing systems.
Super-node 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Hybrid decentralized indexing.
In these systems each super-node is associated with a set of nodes and every node connects
to the super-node to which it belongs. When a search for a resource item is issued by a node, a
lookup message will follow the path from the super-node of the node to the other super nodes; the
operation will be repeated until success or until all paths are completely searched (see Figure 5.5).
5.2.2.2 Analyzing the Dependability of Overlay Network Protocols
The dependability of a system is that property of the system which allows reliance to
be justifiably placed on the service it delivers [13]. In fact a system’s dependability expresses
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the expectations of its users regarding how the system meets their requirements. We consider
dependability qualitatively in terms of the properties reliability, scalability, availability, security
and integrity.
The evaluation has been performed using a 4-level grade score, assuming that grade ”A”
is the highest score (excellent), grade ”B” is the good score, grade ”C” is the medium score and
grade ”D” is the lowest one (bad).
Reliability is a measure of the continuous delivery of a proper service [13]. In principle, the
absence of centralized control and coordination makes P2P systems robust with respect to failures
that might occur at any peer. Faults at client peers don’t usually affect system behavior because
only local information is lost, but faults at server peers can result in data loss and denial of service.
• Type I : type I’s topology is random and flat. All peers are equal and there is no single
point of failure. In fact in this type as no one peer is more important that any other peer, the
network is satisfactory reliable. Although all nodes are principally equal, in practice a few
nodes become strategically more important than the others because of the high number of
connections they manage. So if a peer with many connections fails, serious consequences
for routing efficiency occur because several peers can become difficult or impossible to
reach. We assign grade ”C” to it.
• Type II : type II’s topology is purely decentralized and there is no single point of failure.
Furthermore, these systems store reference to a resource in the nearest peers instead only
storing the next one. Moreover, each peer runs a stabilization algorithm that maintains cor-
rectness on references. Chord is a good example for it. So this property increases reliability
of the system. We assign grade ”A” to it.
• Type III : The centralized nature of this type makes it fragile with respect to faults. When
the central server stops working, all services are not usable. To restore this type of system,
client peers should upload information to the centralized server again. So the presence of
a single point of failure makes this type of P2P systems unreliable. It has grade ”D” for
reliability.
• Type IV : Super nodes are selected at run-time based on their capabilities (CPU power,
bandwidth, non-local IP, and etc.), hence the P2P network has a strong support for self-
organization. It means that if a super-node goes down because of failure, another powerful
peer becomes super node. This type is more reliable than type I, So reliability is satisfactory
good and we assign grade ”B” to it.
Scalability is the ability to operate without a noticeable decline in performance despite the change
in the number of nodes that constitutes the system. In fact scalability is the degree of adaptability
that a system exhibits with respect to increasing load situations [28]. P2P systems are dynamic
systems and at any time a node can leave and join the system.
• Type I : in these systems every initial search query generates network traffic. When the
number of peers participating in the network increase, the growing search queries (flood
5. MIDDLEWARE SERVICES PROTOCOLS 75
search with TTL) negatively influence traffic (increase traffic). So increasing the number of
nodes reduces performance of the system because of flooding overhead. So the system has
a limitation in scalability. This type has grade ”C” for scalability.
• Type II : As there are efficient query routing searches in these systems, a growing number of
search queries does not negatively influence on traffic. Hence system has a good scalability.
We assign grade ”A” to it.
• Type III : In these systems a search query directly goes to the central server. By increasing
the number of search queries, the server finally goes down due to an overload situation.
So the central server easily becomes overloaded with requests because of performance and
bandwidth limitations. Taking scalability into account, it is the least scalable topology of
P2P systems. We assign grade ”D” to it.
• Type IV : searching only in the subsets of the decentralized networks results in a serious
reduction of the scope of flooding. Scalability in these systems is satisfactory mainly due to
limited scope of network flooding, self-organizing and adequate number of super nodes. By
having some super nodes, system does not go in overload situation easily. Furthermore if a
super node goes down in an overload situation, another powerful peer becomes super node
(self-organizing property). It has grade ”B”.
Availability is a measure of the frequency of periods of improper service [13]. We say a P2P
is an available system if each query is answered and every response is adequately delivered in
reasonable time (satisfying the user).
In P2P systems routing algorithms highly affect the user satisfaction level and availability
of the system, because it directly responsible for searching time and also guarantees that search is
accurate and feasible in reasonable time.
• Type I : as there is no algorithmic and structural mechanism for query search, system has
weak availability. Search queries are based on flooding with time-to-live (TTL) value; hence
there is no guarantee for finding results and no guarantee for quality of service and time to
find. We assign grade ”D” for availability of this group.
• Type II : Since the lookup is efficient and straightforward, the level of availability may
seem to be high. However it depends on the consistency of information deployed among
the nodes: joining and leaving peers invoke wide-area inconsistency. So availability is
satisfactory for users and we assign grade ”B” to it.
• Type III : in these systems the algorithm of resource discovery is simple. A peer asks a cen-
tralized directory for a search query (existence and location). The simplicity of resource
discovery results in high availability provided that the central server is not overloaded.
Searching covers the entire system scope without any communication overhead and the
search results are delivered with minimum latencies. Grade ”A” is suitable for this group.
• Type IV : furthermore decentralization, the search flooding reduces in the sub-networks of
super nodes; hence response time is satisfactory short. This type has satisfactory availability
in both search results and search time. Availability has grade ”B” in this group.
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Integrity is non-occurrence of improper alteration of information [13]. In P2P systems, integrity
means keeping system state information coherent and up-to-date among all peers.
• Type I : Topology is random and dynamic, and the search process does not utilize any
caches nor indices, hence data integrity is not an issue. On the other hand, there are no
specific mechanisms to support up-to-date data in peers. We assign grade ”D” to it.
• Type II : Although search query and lookup is optimized, leaving and joining peers make
data integrity hard. To ensure efficient lookup, the routing information in all peers must be
kept up-to-date by implementing stabilization protocol (it complicates the system). So the
complexity of handling leaves and joins negatively influences the network’s integrity. It has
grade ”C”.
• Type III : The centralized topology provides a high level of integrity as all information
related to the state of the system is concentrated in one place. Hence, keeping information
up-to-date on participating peers and their resources is easy. We assign grade ”A” to it.
• Type IV : Hybrid topology (decentralized and centralized) influences integrity of system.
Peers frequently exchange information on their neighbors, and, moreover, are able to opti-
mize their connections in terms of locality and workload. So dynamics positively influence
the integrity of system. Frequent exchanges of information allow keeping lists of super-
nodes up-to-date. We assign grade ”B” to it.
Security is defined as a system’s ability to manage and protect sensitive information [28]. Since
in P2P systems the set of active peers is dynamic and peers don’t trust each other, achieving a
high level of security in P2P systems is more difficult than in client server systems. Traditional
security mechanisms to protect data and systems from intruders and attacks, such as firewalls,
cannot protect P2P systems since they are essentially globally distributed. These mechanisms can
also inhibit P2P communication.
• Type I : Among four P2P types mentioned in this article, type I is the best type against
attacks and malicious faults. It has a random distributed nature. All nodes are equal and
there is no reference peer for attack. However, attackers can exploit the small-world network
model to target peers that manage either numerous or important wide-range connections.
In fact only a homogenous distribution of connections provides really no reference point
for attackers. Main threats in this type are flooding, malicious content, virus spreading,
attack on queries and DoS attack. However we assign grade ”A” to it, in related to other
approaches.
• Type II : This type is the worst type against attacks and malicious faults. It has systematic
and algorithmic structure. Any peer can be a reference point for attackers. As an attacker
gets access to a peer, he/she can start various attacks. Main attacks are routing poisoning,
partitioning and virtualization into incorrect network when a new peer joins and contacts
malicious peer, lookup and storage attack, inconsistence behaviors of peers, DoS attack and
unsolicited responses to a lookup query. Hence we assign grade ”D” to this type.
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P2P types Reliability scalability availability Integrity security
Type I C C D D A
Type II A A B C D
Type III D D A A C
Type IV B B B B
Table 5.1: Summary of dependability attributes for P2P types.
P2P types Summary SUM
Type I A+2C+2D 7
Type II 2A+B+C+D 14
Type III 2A+C+2D 11
Type IV 4B+C 13
Table 5.2: Summary of dependability grades for P2P types.
• Type III : In hybrid systems, attackers focus on centralized points. If an attacker gets access
to the central server, performance degrades to zero. However, a centralized architecture
might be more secure towards such attacks due to a centralized trusted server. In the other
words it can prevent such attacks by employing firewalls like in client-server networks. In
general we should use all protected mechanisms used in client-server network for this type
of P2P networks. Main threats are DoS, man-in-the-middle, and Trojan attacks. We assign
grade ”C” to it.
• Type IV : In this type some P2P networks such as Farsite [5] implement Byzantine protocols
to ensure a certain level of security and trust because the protocol won’t allow the entire
group to misbehave or fail unless malicious or faulty peers make up one third of the group’s
members. A drawback is that the Byzantine approach is effective only for small group of
servers. However not all hybrid P2P types implement a Byzantine protocol. Main threats
in this type are flooding, malicious or fake content, virus, etc. We assign grade ”C” to this
group.
Summary : Table 5.1 shows summary of grades that have been assigning to dependability at-
tributes of P2P networks. Now suppose A has 5 points, B has 3 points, C has 1 point and D has
no point. Table 5.2 shows the sum of grades. Type II such as Chord and CAN has highest score
among the analyzed P2P types. So type II is the most dependable P2P network. Type IV has
second rank in dependability attributes as it composes both decentralized and centralized natures.
Type I is the least dependable P2P network.
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5.3 Activity Support Protocols
5.3.1 CIS Protection Protocol
The main aspect that ensures a high level of dependability of the CIS is its intrusion toler-
ance, which achieved through the (physical or virtual) replication of its components. The objective
is to guarantee that valid and correct commands are delivered to a LAN, while invalid or conspic-
uous messages are blocked by the protection service. This should occur even if some of the CIS
replicas are controlled by a malicious adversary. In this section we describe the design of the
intrusion-tolerant CIS, starting with the design rationale, and then we define the algorithms it
executes.
Several intrusion-tolerant services have been proposed in the literature (e.g., storage [17,
39, 61], certification authorities [73, 101], and DNS [16]), either based on Byzantine quorum
systems (BQS) [60, 101] or state machine replication (SMR) [17, 78]. However, the CIS design
presents two very interesting challenges that make it essentially different from those services. The
first is that a firewall-like component has to be transparent to protocols that pass through it, so
it can not modify the protocols themselves to obtain intrusion tolerance. This also means that
recipient nodes will ignore any internal CIS intrusion tolerance mechanisms, and as such they
cannot protect themselves from messages forwarded by faulty replicas not satisfying the security
policy. This section shows that these challenges are not trivial and presents a solution that is based
neither on BQS nor on SMR.
Although the CIS protection service is designed for critical infrastructures protection, any
system/network could be protected by a CIS. However, the design takes into consideration the
specific aspects of critical infrastructures since (i.) the solution must comply with legacy/standard
components that cannot be easy replaced in critical infrastructures; and (ii.) the solution we
propose is more costly and has less packet processing capacity than common (non-replicated)
firewalls, so it is more adequate for protecting low-traffic critical facilities than high-bandwidth
corporate networks.
5.3.1.1 Design Rationale
To understand the rationale of the design of the intrusion-tolerant CIS, consider the prob-
lem of implementing a replicated firewall between a non-trusted WAN and the trusted LAN that
we want to protect. Further assume that we wish to ensure that only the correct messages (accord-
ing to the deployed policy) go from the WAN side, through the CIS, to the station computers2 in
the LAN. A first problem is that the traffic has to be received by all n replicas, instead of only 1
(as in a normal firewall), so that messages can be evaluated by all replicas. A second problem is
that up to f replicas can be faulty and behave maliciously, both towards other replicas and towards
the station computers.
2Station computers in SCADA/PCS networked systems are the front-ends of control devices.
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Our solution to the first problem is to use a device (e.g., an Ethernet hub) to broadcast
the traffic to all replicas. These verify whether the messages comply with the OrBAC policy and
do a vote, approving the messages if and only if at least f + 1 different replicas vote in favor. A
message approved by the CIS is then forwarded to its destination by a randomly selected replica,
so there is no unnecessary traffic multiplication inside the LAN. The way we deal with omissions
in the broadcast is addressed later in this Section.
The second problem is usually addressed with masking protocols of the Byzantine type,
which extract the correct result from the n replicas, despite f maliciously faulty: only messages
approved by f +1 replicas should go through (one of which must be correct since at most f can
be faulty). Since the result must be sent to the station computers, either it is consolidated at the
source, or at the destination.
The simplest and most usual approach is to implement a front-end in the destination host
that accepts a message if: (1) f +1 different replicas send it; or (2) the message has a certificate
showing that f +1 replicas approve it [11]; or (3) the message has a signature generated by f +1
replicas using a threshold cryptography scheme [29]. These solutions would imply modifying the
hosts’ software. However, modifying the software of the SCADA/PCS system can be complicated,
and the traffic inside the protected LAN would be multiplied by n in certain cases (every replica
would send the message to the LAN), so this solution is undesirable.
So we should turn ourselves to consolidation at the source, and sending only one, but
correct, forwarded message, in a way similar to an active replication scheme of Delta-4 [22].
However, what is innovative here is that source-consolidation mechanisms should be transparent
to the (standard) station computers. Moreover, a faulty replica has access to the LAN (contrarily
to the proposal of [22] where only the fail-silent adapters had access to the LAN) so it can send
incorrect traffic to the station computers, which typically can not distinguish faulty from correct
replicas. This makes consolidation at the source a hard problem.
The solution to the second problem (the existence of up to f faulty replicas) lies on using
IPsec, a set of standard protocols that are expected to be generalized in SCADA/PCS systems,
according to best practice recommendations from expert organizations and governments [87].
Henceforth, we assume that the IPSec Authentication Header (AH) protocol runs both in the
station computers and in the CIS replicas. The basic idea is that station computers will only
accept messages with a valid IPSec/AH Message Authentication Code (MAC), which can only
be produced if the message is approved by f + 1 different replicas. However, IPSec/AH MACs
are HMACs (Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication [56]), generated using a shared key3 and
a hash function, so it is not possible to use threshold cryptography. As the attentive reader will
note, the shared key storage becomes a vulnerability point that can not be overlooked in a high
resilience design, therefore, there must be some secure component that stores the shared key and
produces MACs for messages approved by f +1 replicas.
The requirement in the previous paragraph implies a set of trustworthy (secure) compo-
nents immersed in non-trustworthy (Byzantine-on-failure) environment. Recent research points
to the need for representing these scenarios where different fault models coexist, through hy-
3We assume that IPSec/AH is used with manual key management [53].
80 5.3. ACTIVITY SUPPORT PROTOCOLS
brid (and not homogeneous) distributed system models and architectures. In such architectures,
stronger components also nick-named wormholes, provide services to the rest of the system fol-
lowing weaker assumptions, through a well-defined interface [89].
Figure 5.6 represents the intrusion-tolerant CIS architecture. Local wormholes (repre-
sented by the small W boxes) provide services for a secure voting protocol that produces a MAC
for a message if at least f + 1 replicas approved it. Each CIS replica is deployed in a different
operating system (e.g., Linux, FreeBSD, Windows XP), and the operating systems are configured
to use different passwords and different internal firewalls (e.g., iptables, ipf). A second traffic
replication device (see figure, right hand side) is used precisely for the replicas to receive what-
ever the others send to the LAN. This enables us to implement controls to reduce the probability
of a message being forwarded by more than one replica.
Figure 5.6: Intrusion-tolerant CIS architecture.
The CIS does not provide exactly-once semantics, i.e., messages can be lost when the
traffic is high and the reception buffers of the replicas become full. This is not different from
regular firewalls, except that the CIS operation is more complex so the throughput is expected
to be lower. However, it is important to notice that almost all wide area control protocols, and
specially the ones designed for Power Systems like ICCP [47] and IEC 61850 [48], are designed
on top of TCP, which ensures reliable communication even if the network (in this case the CIS)
loses messages.
5.3.1.2 System Model
The system is composed by n CIS replicas CIS = {CIS1, ...,CISn}. These replicas are
deployed in the intersection between the WAN and the LAN in such a way that all data crossing
the boundaries of one of these networks must pass through the CIS. The hybrid system model
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encompasses two parts [89]: the payload and the wormhole.
Payload. Asynchronous system with n ≥ 2 f + 1 replicas in which at most f can be subject to
Byzantine failures. If a replica does not fail during the execution of the CIS it is said to be correct,
otherwise it is said to be faulty. Every CIS replica has a local clock that is assumed only to make
progress. These clocks are not synchronized. We assume fault independence for the replicas,
i.e., the probability of a replica be compromised is independent of another replica failure. This
assumption is substantiated by the diversity mechanisms employed in the CIS replicas (different
OS, passwords, and internal firewall), and its coverage can be made as high as desired, through
additional kinds of diversity [68]. Finally, we assume also that the station computers can not be
compromised4.
Wormhole. Asynchronous secure tamper proof subsystem W = {W1, ...,Wn} in which at most
fc ≤ f local wormholes can fail by crash. We assume that when a local wormholeWi crashes, the
corresponding payload replica CISi crashes together. Each local wormhole stores two symmetric
keys: KW – shared between the wormholes and used for vote authentication; and KLAN – shared
between the station computers of the LAN and the local wormholes, such that station computers
only accept messages authenticated with this key (the IPSec key).
Network. The assumptions underlying LAN and WAN communication are as follows. We con-
sider that the messages arriving at CIS replicas both from the WAN and the LAN have unreliable
fair multicast semantics, a trivial extension of the commonly assumed fair links abstraction [6, 59]
to multicast: if a message is multicasted infinitely many times it will be received by all its correct
receivers infinitely many times. The two primitives offered by this service are: U-multicast(G,m),
to multicast a message m to the group G, and U-receive(G,m), to receive m that was multicast to
G, where G can be either WAN or LAN. This is substantiated in practice by the traffic replication
devices. We assume that all communication between replicas and other machines from the WAN
and the LAN are based on these primitives. Additionally, all CIS replicas communicate through
point-to-point reliable channels for voting approved messages. These channels can be imple-
mented on the protected LAN or on a separate network (that can be a Virtual LAN configured on
the LAN or WAN switches acting as traffic replication devices – see Figure 5.6).
Cryptography. Our protocols use a collision-resistant hash function H, which receives an arbi-
trarily long input and produces a fixed-length output in such a way that it is infeasible to find two
messages with the same hash. Additionally, the HMACs used in IPSEC are assumed to inherit
the collision resistance property from the hash functions in which they are based [56], i.e., that it
is infeasible to find two messages that for a key K have the same MAC. A message m is signed
with a key K by concatenating m with a MAC of m produced with K. We use mσ to represent a
message m signed with some key K, i.e., mσ = m.MAC(m,K).
4It is the trusted network that we aim to protect, exactly in the sense of preventing it from being compromised.
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5.3.1.3 Service Properties
Before defining the service properties offered by the CIS, let us define the concept of legal
message: a message is said to be legal if it is in accordance with the current deployed policy
P. A message not in accordance with P is said to be illegal. Moreover, a message is said to be
processed by the destination machine if its content is delivered to the application layer (e.g., the
SCADA system). The basic properties offered by the CIS are the following:
• Validity : A legal message received by at least one correct CIS replica is forwarded to its
destination machine;
• Integrity : An illegal message is never processed by its destination machine.
Notice that these two properties are sufficiently weak to be satisfied by a system with
unreliable fair multicast communication and strong enough to ensure that only legal messages
will be processed at LAN hosts.
5.3.1.4 Message Processing Protocol
Here we present the main protocol executed by the CIS to process messages incoming
from the WAN to the protected LAN. The same algorithm is used to handle messages coming
from the opposite direction (possibly with a more relaxed policy).
The policy verification is made in a policy engine accessed through the function PolEng verify.
We assume that all aspects of policy verification are encapsulated inside this component, which
acts as an oracle that says if a message is legal or not.
Wormhole interface. The interactions between a replica CISi and its local wormhole Wi are
made through a well defined interface that offers three services, invoked through the operations
described in Table 5.3.
Operation Return Type Description
W create vote(m) byte array returns a MAC of message 〈i,m〉 produced with the wormhole
shared key KW
W sign(m,Cm) byte array returns a MAC of message m produced with the shared key KLAN ,
ifCm contains at least f +1 votes (returned by W create vote(m))
from different replicas
W verify(mσ ) boolean returns true if σ is a MAC of m produced with KLAN ,
and false otherwise
Table 5.3: Wormhole services specification.
The Algorithm. The CIS replicas execute Algorithm 9 for processing incoming messages. The
algorithm is composed by three code blocks (WAN message reception, LAN message reception,
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and message retransmission) and all these blocks can be executed by different threads. We assume
the existence of synchronization mechanisms that manage the concurrent access of the threads to
the shared sets (e.g., execution of lines 1 and 2 is atomic). For readability, we chose to not include
such mechanisms explicitly in the algorithm since they are not required for algorithm correctness.
Tvote is the single configuration parameter of the payload protocol and it defines the ex-
pected time required to receive, vote and sign a legal message. Additionally, the algorithm uses
three variables: Voting, the set of messages being voted; Pending, the set of messages received
and approved by the replica that were already signed by the wormhole but not yet forwarded to
the station computer; and TooEarly, the set of correctly signed messages forwarded by some other
replica but not yet received (from the WAN) by the replica.
Algorithm 9 CIS payload (replica CISi).
{Parameters}
integer Tvote {Expected time to vote a message}
{Variables}
set Voting=∅ {Messages being voted}
set Pending=∅ {Not yet forwarded messages}
set TooEarly=∅ {Messages forwarded before their arrival}
{Code for WAN message reception and processing}
upon U-receive(WAN,m)
1: if mσ ∈ TooEarly then
2: TooEarly← TooEarly\{mσ}
3: else
4: if PolEng verify(m) then
5: Voting← Voting∪{m}
6: mσ ← approve(m)
7: Voting← Voting\{m}
8: Pending← Pending∪{mσ}
9: waitRandom()
10: if mσ ∈ Pending then
11: U-multicast(LAN,mσ )
12: end if
13: end if
14: end if
{Code for LAN message reception and processing}
upon U-receive(LAN,mσ )
15: if mσ ∈ Pending then
16: Pending← Pending\{mσ}
17: else ifW verify(mσ ) then
18: TooEarly← TooEarly∪{mσ}
19: end if
function approve(m)
20: votei←W create vote(m)
21: ∀CIS j ∈ CIS,send( j,〈VOTE,H(m),votei〉)
22: Cm←∅
23: repeat
24: wait until receive( j,〈VOTE,H(m),vote j〉)
25: Cm←Cm∪{vote j}
26: σ ←W sign(m,Cm)
27: until σ 6=⊥
28: return mσ
{Periodic task for message retransmission}
for each Tvote that Voting 6=∅
29: ∀m ∈ Voting : U-multicast(WAN,m)
The algorithm begins when a replica receives a message coming from the WAN (lines
1-14). If the received message is not in the TooEarly set and it is legal, all correct replicas will
approve it (line 4) and then invoke the approve function (which will be explained later) to vote
and sign this message (line 6). While the message is being voted and signed, it is stored in the
Voting set (lines 5 and 7). Then, the message is inserted in the Pending set (line 8) and it remains
in this set until it is received from the LAN (lines 15-16)5. Finally, the replica waits for a random
time interval (function waitRandom – line 9) and if the message is still in the Pending set, it is
forwarded to the LAN (lines 10-11). The random waiting is implemented to avoid that all replicas
forward the accepted message.
The algorithm contains several controls to deal with message losses, replica failures, and
abnormal message ordering. The first of these controls deals with message omissions on the
5Recall that when a replica forwards a message to the LAN, it goes not only to the station computers but also to
all CIS replicas.
84 5.3. ACTIVITY SUPPORT PROTOCOLS
WAN: when a replica receives and approves a message m, it stores it in the Voting set (line 5)
before starting the vote and sign procedure. The message is removed from this set only when it
is signed (line 7). For each Tvote time units that Voting is not empty, its content is multicasted to
the other CISs (line 29). This ensures that the message being voted will eventually be received by
other correct CIS replicas (due to the fairness assumption) and will then be voted. It is possible that
some replica forwards a correctly signed message to the LAN without some other replicas having
received it from the WAN. In order to deal with these “early messages” on the LAN and optimize
CIS performance, we use the TooEarly set. When a not-pending legal message is received in
the LAN, it will be stored in this set (lines 17-18) and stay there until it is received from the
WAN (lines 1-2). The Pending and TooEarly sets are not necessary to satisfy the CIS properties.
These sets are used with two goals: to reduce message duplication in the LAN (Pending set
+ waitRandom function), and to optimize CIS performance by avoiding policy verification and
message approval when a message was already previously signed and forwarded by some other
replica (TooEarly set). Moreover, given that messages arriving from the WAN and the LAN have
unreliable semantics, these sets need to be periodically reset in order to avoid messages staying
there forever.
The most important part of the algorithm is the approve function (lines 20-28), which
comprises the steps executed to vote for and sign a legal message. The function begins with the
replica calling the wormhole to build a vote for the message (line 20) and sending this vote to
all other replicas (line 21). Each replica then waits to receive votes from other replicas until it
manages to get a sufficient number of valid votes to make the wormhole produce a signature for
the approved message (lines 23-27).
5.3.1.5 Wormhole Protocol
The implementation of the three services provided by the wormhole is presented in Algo-
rithm 10. The replica id is stored inside the tamper proof memory of the local wormhole together
with two symmetric keys that are used to authenticate different messages: the key KW is used to
authenticate vote messages that can be later verified by other wormholes; and the key KLAN is
used to sign approved messages to be forwarded to the protected LAN. These keys are used to
authenticate messages using MACs.
Algorithm 10Wormhole services (local wormholeWi).
{Parameters}
integer i {Replica id – for vote generation}
key KW {Wormholes key – for vote authentication}
key KLAN {Service key – for message authentication}
{Services}
serviceW create vote(m)
1: returnMAC(〈i,m〉,KW )
serviceW sign(m,Cm)
2: if |{v∈Cm : ∃ j s.t. v=MAC(〈 j,m〉,KW )}| ≥ f +1 then
3: returnMAC(m,KLAN)
4: else
5: return ⊥
6: end if
serviceW verify(mσ )
7: ifMAC(m,KLAN) = σ then return true else return false
The service W create vote(m) uses the key KW to generate the MAC for 〈i,m〉 (line 1).
Since the id of the replica i cannot be modified by the payload and the key is secretly stored inside
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the wormhole, it is impossible for a malicious payload to impersonate other replicas in the voting
phase.
W sign(m,Cm) calculates the MAC σ of m using the shared key KLAN if and only if the
replica payload presents a certificate set Cm containing at least f + 1 valid votes produced by
different replicas wormholes (lines 2-3). If there is no such number of valid votes, the wormhole
returns the error value ⊥ (line 5).
Service W verify(mσ ) receives as input a message m allegedly signed with KLAN and re-
turns true if the MAC for m produced using KLAN corresponds to σ , and false otherwise (line
7).
5.3.1.6 CIS Design Options
In this section we present some design options for the CIS protection service just described.
Since these options make the CIS more costly, we decided not to include them in the main design,
but to present these in a separate section.
Dealing with DoS Attacks from Malicious Replicas. A malicious CIS replica can flood the
WAN and LAN networks with illegal messages aiming to delay the forwarding of legal mes-
sages. This kind of attack can degrade the performance of the CIS as a whole. More generi-
cally, intrusion-tolerant designs are typically vulnerable to DoS attacks given that they compro-
mise the network fairness/reliability commonly assumed in Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithms
(e.g., [17, 100, 101]).
Considering the CIS architecture described before, a practical way to deal with this prob-
lem is to integrate an intrusion detection system in the traffic replication devices in order to monitor
the networks connecting the CIS replicas and issue alarms when some replica behaves maliciously.
The response to these alarms could be done by a human operator or by some kind of automatic fail-
safe system that could shutdown malicious replicas and notify the system administrator. There are
available in the market switches with integrated intrusion detection systems, e.g., Cisco Catalyst
6500 and Nortel Ethernet Routing Switch 8600.
An alternative solution is to build a distributed secure wormhole, in which all replicas’
local wormholes are connected by a secure network. With this control network, the whole vot-
ing protocol can be securely executed by the wormholes (in a crash-failure model), preventing
malicious replicas from disturbing it. Moreover, with the local wormholes connected through a
secure network, if a malicious replica floods the LAN with invalid messages, other correct CIS
replicas can notify the distributed wormhole about this behavior. When the malicious replica’s
local wormhole knows that at least f + 1 other replicas suspect that its payload is faulty, it can
shutdown the machine or recover it.
Supporting Statefull Firewalls. The CIS design presented in this section applies to stateless
firewalls, which is the most common type of firewall used. However, some applications require
statefull security policies, in which traffic is approved or denied taking into consideration the mes-
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sages approved/denied in the past (e.g., some data message is only forwarded if some connection
message was sent before).
The CIS policy engine can provide statefull semantics as long as one ensures that all mes-
sages are verified in the same order in all CIS replicas. In other words, we need an agreement
protocol to ensure that all messages are evaluated in total order. This protocol could require either
f more replicas and some timing assumptions (e.g., [17]) or the same number of replicas and a
distributed secure and timely wormhole [23].
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5.3.2 Access Control and Authorization Protocols
In Section 3.3.2, we have identified the web services of different CII’s scenarios (scenarios
1, 2, 3, 4) of WP1 D2. In this section, we detail the invocations of the web services according to
a PolyOrBAC security policy. The aim is thus to present the protocols of secure communications
using PolyOrBAC web services. In this respect, we give PolyOrBAC rules ensuring the secure
functioning of the different scenarios.
We briefly explain here the functioning of OrBAC derivation of rules, the derivation of
permissions (i.e., instantiation of security rules) can be formally expressed as follows:
∀org∈Organisations,∀s∈ Sub jects,∀activ∈Activities,∀o∈Ob jects,∀r∈Roles,∀a∈
Actions,∀v ∈View,∀c ∈Contexts,
Permission(org,r,v,activ,c)∧
Empower(org,s,r)∧
Consider(org,a,activ)∧
Use(org,o,v)∧
Hold(org,s,a,o,c)
⇒ Ispermitted(s,a,o).
This rule means that:
If a security rule specifies that:
• in org, role r can carry out the activity ’activ’ on the view ’v’ when the context ’c’
is True, and
• in org, r is assigned to subject s, and
• in org, action a is a part of activity activ, and
• in org object o is part of view v, and
• the context c is True for the triple (org, s, a, o).
Then s is allowed to carry out a on o.
Example:
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Permission(B, Accountant, Account, Consulting, Urgency) ∧
i.e. Organization B grants role Accountant Permission to perform activity Consulting
on view Account within context Urgency.
Empower(B, Bob, Accountant) ∧
i.e. Organisation B empower subject Bob with the role Accountant.
Consider(B, OpenXMLFile(), Consulting) ∧
i.e. Organisation B considers that action OpenXMLFile() belongs to the activity
Consulting.
Use(B, account1, Account) ∧
i.e. Organisation B uses object account1 as an Account.
Hold (B, Bob, OpenXMLFile(), account1, Urgency) ∧
i.e. in organization B, context Urgency is true between subject Bob, object account1
and action OpenXMLFile().
⇒ Is permitted(Bob, OpenXMLFile(), account1)
i.e. subject Bob is allowed to carry out the action OpenXMLFile() on object account1.
5.3.2.1 Scenario 1: DSO Tele-operation (Emergency and Normal Conditions)
Figure 5.7 summarises the different web services, virtual users, and ws-images, and re-
sources involved in the execution of scenario 1.
Figure 5.7: Scenario 1 users and services.
A. WS5-teleoperation
o Provider: DSO SS.
o Client: DSO ACC.
Execution Scenario:
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• The operator John in DSO ACC performs tele-operation over the DSO SS.
• When operator John access (perform tele-operation over) WS5teleoperation-Image, the ex-
ecution of WS5-teleoperation is automatically activated.
• WS5teleoperation-Image is the local representation of the remote WS5-teleoperation.
• WS5-teleoperation consists in ordering the virtual user5 in DSO SS to access (perform tele-
operation request over) object object-teleMCDTU.
• The Virtual user5 is the representation of DSO ACC in DSO SS.
• Virtual user5 is created at the negotiation phase (for WS) between DSO ACC and DSO SS.
We present here the different OrBAC predicates that manage Access Control for the Tele-
operation web service at the level of the organisation that invokes the service (DSO ACC) and the
one that provides it (DSO SS).
OrBAC rules at DSO ACC
Permission(DSO ACC(org), DSO-role for ACC(role), Access(activity), ACC Distribution circuits(view), normal(context) )
Empower(DSO ACC(org), John(Subject), DSO-role for ACC(role))
Consider(DSO ACC(org), RWX(action), Access (activity))
Use(DSO ACC(org), WS5teleoperation-Image(object), ACC Distribution Circuits(view))
Hold(DSO ACC(org), John(Subject), RWX(action), WS5teleoperation-Image(object), emergency(context)).
Then is-permitted(John(Subject), RWX(action), WS1teleoperation-Image(object))
OrBAC rules at DSO SS
Permission(DSO SS(org), DSO-role for SS(role), Access (activity), DSO SS Distribution Circuits(view), normal(context))
Empower(DSO SS(org), virtual user5(Subject), DSO for SS(role))
Consider(DSO SS(org), RWX(action), Access (activity))
Use(DSO SS(org), object-teleMCDTU(object), DSO SS Distribution Circuits(view))
Hold(DSO SS(org), virtual user5(Subject), RWX(action), object-teleMCDTU(object), normal(context)).
Then is-permitted(virtual user5(Subject), RWX(action), object-teleMCDTU(object))
5.3.2.2 Scenario 2 : Interaction Between TSO and DSO Operators in Emergency Conditions
Figure 5.8 summarises the different web services, virtual users (representing distant users
that request web services), and ws-images (local images of distant invocated web services), and
resources involved in the execution of scenario 2.
A. WS1-armingrequest
o Provider: DSO ACC.
o Client: TSO RCC (an operator or a process).
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Figure 5.8: Scenario 2 users and services.
Execution Scenario:
• We assume that an EMS, an operator in TSO RCC (or a process running in TSO RCC)
orders the DSO ACC to arm its DSO SS MCDTU.
• When the EMS accesses (perform arming request over) WS1-Image, the execution of WS1-
armingrequest is automatically activated.
• WS1-Image is the local representation of the remote WS1-armingrequest.
• WS1-armingrequest consists in ordering the virtual user1 in DSO ACC to access (perform
arming request over) object WS2-Image.
• The Virtual user1 is the representation of TSO RCC in DSO ACC. Virtual user1 is created
at the negotiation phase (for WS) between TSO RCC and TSO SS.
• We recall that a virtual user is a user (temporarily or not) created to handle a remote request
to a local resource.
We present here the different OrBAC predicates that manage Access Control for the Arm-
ing request web service at the level of the organisation that invokes the service (TSO RCC) and
the one that provides it (DSO ACC).
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OrBAC rules at TSO RCC
Permission(TSO RCC(org), TSO-role for RCC(role), Access(activity), RCC Distribution circuits(view), emergency(context) )
Empower(TSO RCC(org), EMS(Subject), TSO-role for RCC(role))
Consider(TSO RCC(org), RWX(action), Access (activity))
Use(TSO RCC(org), WS1-Image(object), RCC Distribution Circuits(view))
Hold(TSO RCC(org), EMS(Subject), RWX(action), WS1-Image(object), emergency(context)).
Then is-permitted(EMS(Subject), RWX(action), WS1-Image(object))
OrBAC rules at DSO ACC
Permission(DSO ACC(org), DSO-role for ACC(role), Access (activity), DSO ACC Distribution Circuits(view), emer-
gency(context))
Empower(DSO ACC(org), virtual user1(Subject), DSO-role for ACC(role))
Consider(DSO ACC(org), RWX(action), Access (activity))
Use(DSO ACC(org), WS2-Image(object), DSO ACC Distribution Circuits(view))
Hold(DSO ACC(org), virtual user1(Subject), RWX(action), WS2-Image(object), emergency(context)).
Then is-permitted(virtual user1(Subject), RWX(action), WS2-Image(object))
B. WS2-armingactivation
o Provider: DSO SS.
o Client: DSO ACC.
Execution Scenario:
• When virtual user1 access (performs arming activation over) WS2-Image, the execution of
WS2-armingactivation is automatically activated.
• WS2-image is the local image of WS2-armingactivation.
• WS2-armingactivation consists in ordering a virtual user2 to access (perform the arming
activation over) Object-armMCDTU in DSO SS.
• The Virtual user2 is the image of DSO ACC in DSO SS. Virtual user2 is created at the
negotiation phase between DSO ACC and DSO SS.
• When virtual user2 access (perform arming activation over) Object-armMCDTU, the real
physical command of arming activation is launched over the physical MCDTU.
• We can say that operator EMS from TSO RCC used virtual user1 and then virtual user2 as
relays and performed the arming command over the DSO SS MCDTU.
We present here the different OrBAC predicates that manage Access Control for the Arm-
ing activation web service at the level of the organisation that invokes the service (DSO ACC) and
the one that provides it (DSO SS).
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OrBAC rules at DSO ACC
Permission(DSO ACC(org), DSO-role for ACC(role), Access (activity), DSO ACC Distribution Circuits(view), emer-
gency(context))
Empower(DSO ACC(org), virtual user1(Subject), DSO-role for ACC(role))
Consider(DSO ACC(org), RWX(action), Access (activity))
Use(DSO ACC(org), WS2-Image(object), DSO ACC Distribution Circuits(view))
Hold(DSO ACC(org), virtual user1(Subject), RWX(action), WS2-Image (object), emergency(context)).
Then is-permitted(virtual user1(Subject), RWX(action), WS2-Image(object))
OrBAC rules at DSO SS
Permission(DSO SS(org), DSO-role for SS(role), Access (activity), DSO SS Distribution Circuits(view), emergency(context))
Empower(DSO SS(org), virtual user2(Subject), DSO for SS(role))
Consider(DSO SS(org), RWX(action), Access (activity))
Use(DSO SS(org), object-armMCDTU(object), DSO SS Distribution Circuits(view))
Hold(DSO SS(org), virtual user2(Subject), RWX(action), object-armMCDTU(object), emergency(context)).
Then is-permitted(virtual user2(Subject), RWX(action), object-armMCDTU (object))
D. WS4-loadsheddingactivation
o Provider: DSO SS.
o Client: TSO SS.
Execution Scenario:
• When Operator (Local function of sentinel) access (performs Load Shedding over) WS4-
Image, the execution of WS4-loadsheddingactivation is automatically activated.
• WS4-image is the local image of WS4-loadsheddingactivation.
• WS4-loadsheddingactivation consists in ordering a virtual user4 to access (perform the load
shedding over) Object-LSMCDTU in DSO SS.
• The Virtual user4 is the image of TSO SS in DSO SS. Virtual user4 is created at the negoti-
ation phase between TSO SS and DSO SS since they are different.
• When virtual user4 access (perform load shedding over) Object-LSMCDTU, the real phys-
ical command of Load Shedding is launched over the physical MCDTU.
• Operator (Local function of sentinel) used virtual user4 as relays and performed the load
shedding over the DSO SS MCDTU.
We present here the different OrBAC predicates that manage Access Control for the Load
shedding request web service at the level of the organisation that invokes the service (TSO SS)
and the one that provides it (DSO SS).
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OrBAC rules at TSO SS
Operator (Local function of sentinel)
Permission(TSO SS(org), TSO-role for SS(role), Access (activity), TSO SS Distribution Circuits(view), emergency(context))
Empower(TSO SS(org), Operator (Local function of sentinel)(Subject), TSO-role for SS(role))
Consider(TSO SS(org), RW(action), Access (activity))
Use(TSO SS(org), WS4-Image(object), TSO SS Distribution Circuits(view))
Hold(TSO SS(org), Operator (Local function of sentinel)(Subject), RWX(action), WS4-Image (object), emergency(context)).
Then is-permitted(Operator (Local function of sentinel)(Subject), RWX(action), WS4-Image (object))
OrBAC rules at DSO SS
Permission(DSO SS(org), DSO-role for SS(role), Access (activity), DSO SS Distribution Circuits(view), emergency(context))
Empower(DSO SS(org), virtual user4(Subject), DSO for SS(role))
Consider(DSO SS(org), RWX(action), Access (activity))
Use(DSO SS(org), object-LSMCDTU(object), DSO SS Distribution Circuits(view))
Hold(DSO SS(org), virtual user4(Subject), RWX(action), object-LSMCDTU(object), emergency(context)).
Then is-permitted(virtual user4(Subject), RWX(action), object-LSMCDTU(object))
Figure 5.9 presents a sequence diagram summarising the different steps while invocating
the Arming web service.
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5.3.2.3 Scenario 3: Integration of DSO Operation and Maintenance Functions
Figure 5.10 summarises the different web services, virtual users, and ws-images, and re-
sources involved in the execution of scenario 3. Note that this scenario is still under development
and there will be possible evolutions of it.
Figure 5.10: Scenario 3 users and services.
A. WS6-operation
o Provider: DSO SS.
o Client: DSO ACC.
Execution Scenario:
• The operator John in DSO ACC performs operation over the DSO SS.
• When operator John access (perform operation over) WS6operation-Image, the execution
of WS6-operation is automatically activated.
• WS6operation-Image is the local representation of the remote WS6-operation.
• WS6-operation consists in ordering the virtual user6 in DSO SS to access (perform opera-
tion request over) object object-operMCDTU.
• The Virtual user6 is the representation of DSO ACC in DSO SS.
• Virtual user6 is created at the negotiation phase (for WS) between DSO ACC and DSO SS.
We present here the different OrBAC predicates that manage Access Control for the Oper-
ation web service at the level of the organisation that invokes the service (DSO ACC) and the one
that provides it (DSO SS).
OrBAC rules at DSO ACC
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Permission(DSO ACC(org), DSO-role for ACC(role), Access(activity),ACC Distribution circuits(view), normal(context) )
Empower(DSO ACC(org), John(Subject), DSO-role for ACC(role))
Consider(DSO ACC(org), RWX(action), Access (activity))
Use(DSO ACC(org), WS6operation-Image(object), ACC Distribution Circuits(view))
Hold(DSO ACC(org), John(Subject), RWX(action), WS6operation-Image(object), emergency(context)).
Then is-permitted(John(Subject), RWX(action), WS6operation-Image(object))
OrBAC rules at DSO SS
Permission(DSO SS(org), DSO-role for SS(role), Access (activity), DSO SS Distribution Circuits(view), normal(context))
Empower(DSO SS(org), virtual user6(Subject), DSO for SS(role))
Consider(DSO SS(org), RWX(action), Access (activity))
Use(DSO SS(org), object-operMCDTU(object), DSO SS Distribution Circuits(view))
Hold(DSO SS(org), virtual user6(Subject), RWX(action), object-operMCDTU(object), normal(context)).
Then is-permitted(virtual user6(Subject), RWX(action), object-operMCDTU(object))
5.3.2.4 Scenario 4: Maintenance of ICT Components of DSO
Figure 5.11 summarises the different web services, virtual users, and ws-images, and re-
sources involved in the execution of scenario 4. Note that this scenario is still under development
and there will be possible evolutions of it.
Figure 5.11: Scenario 4 users and services.
WS1-maintenance
o Provider: DSO SS.
o Client: DSO ACC.
Execution Scenario:
• The operator John in DSO ACC performs operation over the DSO SS.
• When operator John access (perform maintenance over) WS7 maintenance-Image, the exe-
cution of WS7-maintenance is automatically activated.
• WS7 maintenance-Image is the local representation of the remote WS7-maintenance.
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• WS7- maintenance consists in ordering the virtual user7 in DSO SS to access (perform
maintenance request over) object object-maintMCDTU.
• The Virtual user7 is the representation of DSO ACC in DSO SS.
• Virtual user7 is created at the negotiation phase (for WS) between DSO ACC and DSO SS.
We present here the different OrBAC predicates that manage Access Control for the Main-
tenance web service at the level of the organisation that invokes the service (DSO ACC) and the
one that provides it (DSO SS).
OrBAC rules at DSO ACC
Permission(DSO ACC(org), DSO-role for ACC(role), Access(activity), ACC Distribution circuits(view), normal(context) )
Empower(DSO ACC(org), John(Subject), DSO-role for ACC(role))
Consider(DSO ACC(org), RWX(action), Access (activity))
Use(DSO ACC(org), WS7maintenance-Image(object), ACC Distribution Circuits(view))
Hold(DSO ACC(org), John(Subject), RWX(action), WS7maintenance-Image(object), emergency(context)).
Then is-permitted(John(Subject), RWX(action), WS7maintenance-Image(object))
OrBAC rules at DSO SS
Permission(DSO SS(org), DSO-role for SS(role), Access (activity), DSO SS Distribution Circuits(view), normal(context))
Empower(DSO SS(org), virtual user7(Subject), DSO for SS(role))
Consider(DSO SS(org), RWX(action), Access (activity))
Use(DSO SS(org), object-maintMCDTU(object), DSO SS Distribution Circuits(view))
Hold(DSO SS(org), virtual user7(Subject), RWX(action), object-maintMCDTU(object), normal(context)).
Then is-permitted(virtual user7(Subject), RWX(action), object-maintMCDTU(object))
Figure 5.12 presents a sequence diagram summarising the different steps while invocating
the Teleoperation (Operation, or Maintenance) web service.
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5.4 Monitoring and Failure Detection
This section contains a preliminary implementation of the monitoring and failure detection
services described in Section 3.4. From a system-level viewpoint, monitoring and failure detection
activities are organized as follows:
• Every CIS diagnoses itself over time, in order to judge the healthy/faulty status of its re-
sources/services, primarily for local reconfiguration aims. This step is the result of the
activity of the “CIS Self-Diagnosis” service.
• Every CIS (when asked for) declares its “health status” (full report, only relevant parts or
a signature of them). Since CISs are not completely trusted by the others, they do not
completely trust the declared “health status”, so they also try to build a private perception of
the other CISs, basing on the possible direct relationships with them. The “declared status”
and the “perceived statuses” could be conflicting (e.g. because of communication problems
or because of deliberate and malicious causes). When CIS A needs to use some remote
resources/services on CIS C, but A has no private perception of C, gossip can be applied: if
A trusts B and B has a private perception of C, the private perception of C as seen by A can
inherit the private perception of C as seen by B.
• When necessary, e.g. when the private perception is not enough for some reason, (pertinent
groups of) CISs exchange among them their own private perceptions of a certain resource,
in order to reach an agreement about that. The result of the agreement overrides the result
of the private diagnosis.
5.4.1 Design Rationale
In the lifetime of a specific instance of a system, a rich flux of information relative to
diverse aspects of the ongoing activities comes from a number of sources: hardware sensors
(voltages, currents, power, temperatures, fan speeds, vibrations, accelerations); operating system
messages (positive acknowledges, completion codes, warnings, various levels of exceptions, etc);
communication subsystem messages (status, errors, timing, etc); application messages (normal
exits, acquire/release system resources, interface errors, internal captured errors, etc.). Messages
can be category-labeled accordingly; each category shows up as a unevenly spaced time series of
data (whether sensor readings or more complex messages). The collection of all these time- and
type-ordered data amounts to the innards’ behavior of the system.
However, the time series are essentially unlimited. More workable structures can be con-
structed as sets of time-limited sub-series, built taking care of choosing time cuts distant enough
to capture significant behavior chunks.
A set {SG} of such rough chunks can be set up initially from system logs, then kept up-
to-date by slicing the behavior’s information flux.
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The present design of an evolute diagnosis subsystem is based on the following structures,
built over the innard’s behavior of the target system:
• A set of specification abiding behaviors {G} where each element is an element taken from
{SG}, possibly enriched with relevant input-output sequences, input values - internal state
tuples, internal state evolution (partial) sequences, etc.; the element being characterized by
being positively abiding by the specs.
• A dynamic collection of unsure behaviors {B} where items from {SG} not found in {G}
are collected on the run.
• A dynamic aggregation matrix {C}, where elements from {B} are grouped, according to a
lumping strategy based on a number of adaptable criteria (e.g., timing correlation, external
stimuli presence, temperature, time of the day, etc.).
The above information structures are operated upon by specialized processes:
• A Collector process (or a concurrent set thereof) gathers the myriad of low-level (and high-
level as well) lively signals from the system, updating mainly the set {B} (but also the set
{G}, upon e.g. system maintenance/update);
• Recognizer process(es) similarly act upon the set {C}, looking for patterns (associations)
already known to be alarming symptoms, and building new ones whenever a “higher level”
error signal overrides this background detection activity. A few available techniques for
pattern recognition over non-periodic time series are under scrutiny.
The “higher level” implies a hierarchy in the misbehavior signals: in fact, elements in {B}
should be intended as deviating patterns not severe enough to require immediate action; it
is common sense that situations do arise bad enough to require corrective action, without
much pondering. In such a case, the current chunk is added to the accumulated knowledge
of bad situations, after being properly formatted and labeled.
5.4.2 Services Specification
The services interface specification is common both in the local view and in the global
view; type/values do differ in each instance.
Collector: The collector service collects detection information (errors) from a specific service/-
component. The detection information is collected following a specified interaction paradigm
(e.g. proactively, reactively or event triggered); the collected information complies with a
specified format and semantics. The interaction paradigm, the format and the semantics of
the collected information all depend on the service/component.
The service detects whether the interaction pattern is violated.
Parameters:
5. MIDDLEWARE SERVICES PROTOCOLS 101
• name: id of the monitored service/component
• interaction paradigm: this is the way the collector collects detection information (proac-
tive, reactive, periodic, other)
• detection format: format of the collected detection information
• detection semantics: semantics of the collected detection information
Normalizer . The normalizer translates the detection information collected by a “Collector” in a
normalized format specified by the parameters.
The normalizer is used by the “Aggregator” as a source of normalized information.
Parameters:
• name: id of the collector providing non normalized detection information
• interaction paradigm: this is the way the collector produces information to be normal-
ized
• detection format: format of the detection information received in input
• detection semantics: semantics of the detection information received in input
• normalized format: format of the normalized detection information
• normalized semantics: semantics of the normalized detection information
Specification:
The “Normalizer” translates the information collected by the “Collector” following the
specified format and semantics for both input and output. The translation function must
be injective (possibly biunique) in order to avoid ambiguity in the normalization.
The service detects whether the interaction pattern is violated and whether the format of the
received information is violated.
Aggregator: The aggregator service assesses the status of a monitored component; the aggre-
gator applies a diagnostic function to normalized detection information gathered overtime
from a specific component/service. Several diagnostic functions can be used (heuristic [10],
probabilistic [25]).
Parameters:
• name: id of the normalized collector providing detection information to the aggregator
• interaction paradigm: this is the way the collector produces information to be gathered
• normalized format: format of the normalized detection information
• normalized semantics: semantics of the normalized detection information
• diagnostic function: function applied to the flow of normalized signals received as
input by the aggregator
• alarms: specifications of the alarms triggered by the diagnostic function.
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Specification:
The “Aggregator” filters the detection information normalized by the “Normalizer” using
the specified diagnostic function.
The service detects whether the interaction pattern is violated and whether the format of the
received information is violated.
Recognizer: The recognizer correlates aggregated detection information coming from several
monitored components/services. The recognizer is the diagnosing entity at system level.
The Recognizer process assembles its results in messages with the following tentative for-
mat:
• <TYP> category of the message (e.g. fault/error/warning)
• <LVL> signal level (one dimensional) - from “debug” to “emergency” [74]
• <TIME> timestamp
• <LOC> physical localization (generally, down to the least replaceable unit)
• <SYS> information on the Operating System status or affected components
• <APP> the co-interested Application software
• <SPN> special annotations, local system instance dependent
where <LVL> gives a measure of the severity of the error reported, and thus it is actually
the first field to be parsed, in case immediate action were to be taken. The format proposed
in [2], the Universal Logger Messages, was not adopted because it carries too little informa-
tion; on the other hand, the full complexity of the BSD Syslog Protocol described in [74] is
not needed, and actually detrimental, in this peculiar context.
Correlation is performed at various levels (e.g. signal severity); correlation is flexible with
respect to the severity of the collected signals: severe signals are quickly recognized and
trigger appropriate notifications to the reconfiguration sub-system.
5.4.3 Diagnosing the Protection Service
The Protection Service (PS) (see also section 3.3.1) is a middleware service performing
egress/ingress access control, implementing an instance of the global security policy. The PS
captures packets that pass through the CIS, checking if these packets satisfy the security policy
and forwarding to the destination node only packets satisfying the security policy (discarding the
others).
The dependability of the PS is currently enhanced using the CIS Proactive-Reactive Re-
covery Service [9], taking advantage of the CIS replicated hybrid architecture.
Monitoring is performed at payload level, where each instance of the protection service
checks whether other replicas behave correctly, triggering specific accusations when necessary.
The following function calls are used by replica i to express accusations about replica j:
5. MIDDLEWARE SERVICES PROTOCOLS 103
• “W detect( j)”: replica i detects that replica j is faulty. This is the case in which replica i
finds an illegal message coming from replica j;
• “W suspect( j)”: replica i suspects that replica j is faulty. This is the case in which replica
i finds that replica j, being the leader, is not forwarding a legal message to the protected
LAN.
Failure detection is performed at wormhole level, where accusations raised by the replicas
are collected and interpreted on the basis of quorums:
• replica j is detected to be maliciously faulty if at least f +1 “W detect( j)” were collected;
in this case, at least one correct replicas detected replica j to be maliciously faulty.
• replica j is suspected of being faulty if at least f +1 accusations were collected; in this case,
at least one correct replica raised a suspect about replica j being faulty.
A quantitative analysis of the recovery strategy was performed (more details can be found
in [35]). The main results of the analysis are presented hereafter, in order to identify the recovery
strategy weak points and open problems and propose enhancements.
5.4.3.1 PRRW Quantitative Analysis
This section presents a quantitative analysis of the PRRW strategy. The relevant figures
of interest are identified and the relevant parameters are described; finally the results of the per-
formed simulations are presented and discussed. Details about models and simulations are avail-
able in [35].
The quantitative analysis of the PRRW strategy aims to evaluate how effective is the com-
promise between proactive and reactive recovery actions. Proactive recoveries rejuvenate the
replicas in predefined instants of time, without being based on any fault detection. This means
that proactive recoveries treat all the faults, including also the latent and hidden ones, which can-
not be treated in other way, but they recover also correct replicas, weakening the availability of the
system. On the other side, reactive recoveries are scheduled only on replicas detected or suspected
of being faulty; replicas not detected of being faulty are never recovered, even if they are actually
faulty, weakening the dependability of the system. Acting on the detection/diagnosis aspects of
the system, we impact on the reactive part and we are hence able to quantify the benefit obtained
by the two kind of recovery.
The relevant measures of interest are system failure probability and system unavailability.
The system fails at time t if one of the following conditions holds:
1. the number of invalid replicas gets over f ;
2. the system is unavailable since t-TO, that is the system is unavailable for a period of time
grater then TO.
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Let PFI(t) be the probability of the system being failed at time t because of condition 1, given that
it was correctly functioning at time t=0. Let PFO(t) be the probability of the system being failed at
time t because of condition 2, given that it was correctly functioning at time t=0. System failure
probability, denoted by PF(t), is defined as the probability of the system being failed at time t,
given that it was not failed at time t=0; system failure probability is obtained as
PF(t) = PFI(t)+PFO(t).
The system is unavailable at time t if one of the following conditions holds:
1. the number of correct replicas is less then f+1 (quorums cannot be reached)
2. there are more than f+1 correct replicas, but the leader is omitting (legal messages are not
forwarded).
Let TU(0, t) be the total time the system is not failed but is unavailable within [0, t] because of one
of the above conditions. Let TA(0, t) be the total time the system is not failed within [0, t]. System
unavailability, denoted by PU(t), is defined as the probability of the system being unavailable at
time t, given that it was correctly working at time t=0; system unavailability is obtained as
PU(t) = TU(0, t)/TA(0, t).
All the model parameters and the basic values used for the evaluations are shown in table
5.4. The relevant parameter used are the following:
• Mission time t. This is the time during which the system is exercised since it starts to work.
t varies in [2628, 42048].
• Detection coverage cM of malicious behavior. cM is the probability of detecting an intruded
replica, and hence the probability of reactively recovery an intruded replica. cM varies in
[0, 1]: if cM=0, no intrusions are detected, whilst if cM=1, all intrusions are detected. cM=1
in the ideal case.
• Probability pI of intrusion manifesting as a permanent invalid behavior. pI varies in [0, 1]:
if pI=0, all intrusions manifest as a permanent omissive behavior; if pI=1, all intrusions
manifest as a permanent invalid behavior.
• Number n of system replicas in the system, maximum number f of corrupted replicas toler-
ated by the system itself and maximum number k of system replicas recovering simultane-
ously.
A first study was performed observing both system failure probability PF(t) and system
unavailability PU(t) over mission time t. Three system configurations were evaluated for three
different values of pI (probability of intrusions manifesting as permanent invalid behavior).
Figure 5.13 shows how PFI(t) and PFO(t) change over mission time t If pI=0, PF(t) is con-
stant as time increases (in this case PF(t)=PFO(t), given that PFI(t)=0). If pI=0.5, PF(t) increases
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Table 5.4: Parameters and their default values
name value meaning
t 2628 Mission time (sec)
n 4 Number of replicas in the system
k 1 Max number of replicas recovering simultaneously
f 1 Max number of corrupted replicas tolerated by the system
TD 146 Time duration of a recovery operation (sec)
TO 60 Duration of system omission before considering the system
failed (sec)
λci [1.9e−7, 3.8e−7] Crash rate, exponentially distributed. Each replica has a
diverse crash rate (from 1 per 60 days to 1 per 30 days)
λoi [1.9e−6, 3.8e−6] Transient omission rate, exponentially distributed. Each
replica has a diverse rate (from 1 per 6 days to 1 per 3 days)
λeo 3.3e−2 Omission duration rate, exponentially distributed. A tran-
sient omission lasts about for 30 seconds
λai [5.8e−5, 1.2e−5] Successful attack (intrusion) rate, exponentially distributed.
Each replica has a diverse rate (from 5 per day to 1 per day)
pI 0.5 Probability of intrusion manifesting as a permanent invalid
behavior (if pI=0 all intrusions manifest as permanent omis-
sions)
cM 0.7 Probability of detecting a malicious behavior
as time increases; the figure shows that PFO(t) is negligible with regard to PFI(t) (PFO(t) decreases
to 0 as time increases). If pI=1, PF(t) increases as time increases; the figure shows that PFO(t)
is constant over time and that PFI(t) increases over time. The system with pI=0 has the smallest
values for PF(t) among the three system considered, whilst the system with pI=1 has the largest
values for PF(t) (at least two orders of magnitude with regard to the system with pI=0).
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Figure 5.13: System failure probability PF(t) over mission time t for different values of pI.
If pI=0, there isn’t any invalid behavior triggering reactive recoveries, so almost all recov-
eries are periodic (reactive recoveries are triggered only on an omissive leader): in this case PF(t)
shows to be almost constant over time. If pI∈{0.5, 1}, there are invalid behaviors triggering reac-
tive recoveries: in both the cases PF(t) shows to be increasing overtime mainly because of PFI(t);
the larger is pI, the larger is PF(t). In general it turns out that PF(t) increases over time mainly
106 5.4. MONITORING AND FAILURE DETECTION
because of the reactive recoveries triggered by invalid behavior.
Figure 5.14 shows how PU(t) changes over mission time t. If pI∈{0, 0.5}, PU(t) decreases
as time increases (both the settings show the same values for the same t). If pI=1, PU(t) shows to
be constant with regard to time; in this case PU(t) is larger than for the other values of pI.
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Figure 5.14: System unavailability PU(t) over mission time t for different values of pI.
PU(t) is decreasing over time (at most is constant), so it is satisfactory in all the system
configurations considered; the positive effect of proactive recoveries refreshing all the replicas is
evident mostly for pI=0, whereas the effect is smaller (but still effective) as pI increases, since
PU(t) is not increasing over time.
Another study was devoted to evaluate both system failure probability PF(t) and system
unavailability PU(t) varying both the detection coverage cM and the probability pI of intrusions
manifesting as invalid behavior. Varying the value of CM we act on the mechanism of reactive
recoveries in the following way: increasing the detection coverage, it increases also the number of
invalid replicas detected to be invalid and hence reactively recovered. If CM=0, reactive recoveries
are triggered only on an omissive leader.
Figure 5.15 and 5.16 show respectively how PFI(t) and PFO(t) change over detection cov-
erage CM for some values of pI. The two figures are plotted using the same scale for the y-axis
in order to make easier their comparison. In general, PFI(t) decreases as CM increases from 0 to
1. The extreme curves correspond to the two extreme system configurations: pI=1, assuming the
largest values, and pI=0, assuming the lowest values: in this last case PFI(t)=0 (the curve is out
of the bounds of the figure). The curve showed in Figure 5.17 which assumes the smallest values
corresponds to the system configuration where pI=0.2. The curve corresponding to pI=1 decreases
quicker than the other curves (it decreases for about one order of magnitude), whilst the curve for
pI=0.2 is almost constant. PFO(t) shows an opposite behavior with respect to PFI(t): it increases
as CM increases from 0 to 1. The extreme curves correspond to the two extreme system config-
urations: pI=0, assuming the largest values, and pI=1, assuming the lowest values (the opposite
behavior with respect to PFI(t)). The curve corresponding to pI=1 increases quicker than the other
curves, whilst the curve for pI=0 is almost constant.
Figure 5.15 and 5.16 show that increasing CM there are two opposite effects with respect to
PFI(t) and PFO(t): the former decreases, because invalid replicas reactively recovered are no longer
weakening the system; the latter increases, because replicas, while recovering, do not contribute
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Figure 5.15: Impact of detection coverage cM on failure probability PFI(t) due to invalid behavior
for different values of pI.
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Figure 5.16: Impact of detection coverage cM on failure probability PFO(t) due to omissive behav-
ior for different values of pI.
to system operation. The overall effect, shown in figure 5.17, is that system failure probability
decreases as detection coverage CM increases. The system was evaluated in this study for t=2628;
the first study described above showed that system failure probability PF(t) increases over time
(except for system configuration where pI=0). We hence suppose that this study, if evaluated for a
larger value of t, should show a larger difference between the extreme system configurations pI=0
and pI=1. This stresses that the value for CM should be as higher as possible.
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Figure 5.17: Impact of detection coverage cM on system failure probability PF(t) for different
values of pI.
Figure 5.18 shows how system unavailability PU(t) changes over detection coverage CM
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for some values of pI. In general, PU(t) increases as CM increases from 0 to 1. The extreme
curves correspond to the two extreme system configurations: pI=0, assuming the largest values,
and pI=1, assuming the lowest values. If pI=0, PU(t) is almost not influenced by changing the
detection coverage, whilst increasing pI the influence of CM becomes more evident (almost an
order of magnitude for pI=1).
3.0e-04
2.0e-04
1.0e-04
6.0e-05
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
Sy
st
em
 u
na
va
ila
bi
lity
 P
U(t
)
cM
pI=0pI=0.2pI=0.4pI=0.5pI=0.6pI=0.8pI=1
Figure 5.18: Impact of detection coverage cM on system unavailability PU(t) for different values
of pI.
It turns out that there are two conflicting effects on system unavailability related to the
increasing number of reactive recoveries. PU(t) is negatively affected by a larger value for the de-
tection coverage cM, because the larger is the detection coverage, the more reactive recoveries are
triggered; the above trend is more evident as the probability pI of intrusion manifesting as invalid
behavior increases, because reactive recoveries are mainly triggered because of invalid behavior.
On the other side, it has to be noticed that the smaller is pI, the worse is system unavailability,
because less reactive recoveries are triggered on faulty replicas.
The results of this study shows that increasing the detection coverage of invalid behavior
has conflicting effects on system failure probability and system availability: the former improves
as cM increases, whilst the latter worsen as cM increases.
The last study performed aimed to evaluate the impact of the number of replicas on both
system failure probability and unavailability. When dealing with the number of replicas in the
system, three parameters are relevant: n, the overall number of replicas in the system, f, the
maximum number of corrupted replicas tolerated by the system and k, the maximum number of
replicas simultaneously recovering without endangering the availability of the system. The values
of the above parameters are disciplined by the following formula: n=2f+1+k. The following
system configurations were evaluated:
1. n=4, f=1, k=1
2. n=5, f=1, k=2
3. n=6, f=1, k=3
4. n=6, f=2, k=1
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Figure 5.19 and 5.20 show system failure probability PF(t) (decomposed in PFI(t) and
PFO(t)) and system unavailability PU(t) for the system configurations described above. In general
PF(t) decreases as the number n of system replicas increases (this trend is due primarily to PFO(t));
for the same value of n, the higher is k and the lower is PF(t). In general PU(t) decreases as the
number n of system replicas increases; for the same value of n, the higher is k and the lower is
PU(t).
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Figure 5.19: System failure probability PF(t) for different system configurations at mission time
t=2628.
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Figure 5.20: System unavailability PU(t) for different system configurations at mission time
t=2628.
It turns out that for the setting used (as shown in table 5.4) the lower system failure prob-
ability and the lower system unavailability is measured in the system configuration 3; this con-
figurations has the highest number n of replicas with regard to the other configurations evaluated.
Configuration 4 has also the same n as configuration 3, but it has a lower value for k (PFO(t) is the
main contributor to PF(t)).
5.4.4 Advantages and Limits of the PRRW Strategy
The CIS intrusion tolerance is currently obtained through a recovery strategy (PRRW)
based on a combination of proactive and reactive recoveries. The use of both proactive and reactive
recoveries shows to be effective since the two techniques possess complementary characteristics.
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Proactive recoveries periodically rejuvenate all the replicas, without any need of fault de-
tection mechanisms (also latent/hidden faults are treated). The period of the proactive recoveries
define a bounded temporal window (between two recoveries of the same replica) which represent
a time limit for an attack attempt to be successful. In fact, this is the time an attacker has for con-
quering a majority of the replicas and thus for taking the control of the entire CIS. On the other
side, being an “unconditional” recovery, the proactive recovery is applied also to correct replicas
which become non available for the time necessary to perform the recovery. Moreover, if only
proactive recovery is used in a system, a replica hit by a fault will be unavailable until the end of
its next proactive recovery.
Reactive recovery is instead triggered only on detection of faults to have hit a replica,
so its effectiveness depends on the assumed fault model and on the coverage of the detection
mechanism used (latent/hidden faults are not treated). Reactive recoveries triggered on replicas
detected of being faulty contribute to decrease system failure probability, as shown in Figure 5.17;
reactive recoveries are in fact performed as soon as possible, however within the duration of df /ke
recoveries, without waiting the next periodic recovery on the same replica. Being the replica
reactively recovered as soon as possible, its rejuvenation is anticipated with respect to its next
proactive recovery, so the (faulty) replica becomes active and correct earlier.
This behavior apparently suggests that the more reactive recoveries are performed, the
worst is system availability as it appears evidently in Figure 5.13 and 5.14 for the curve corre-
sponding to pI=1: in this case all the intrusions manifest as invalid behavior and all the detected
intrusions trigger a reactive recovery (detection coverage cM is set to 0.7 as default). In reality
what happens is that the system ability to survive gets increased, whereas for low values of the
coverage (thus less reactive recoveries) the system fails as soon as replicas get affected by faults.
The PRRW strategy, as our analysis reveals, makes a significant difference in the way
omission and invalid behaviors are treated. This is made evident by observing all the curves at
varying values for pI. Actually invalid behaviors are detected with a coverage cM and trigger
a reactive recovery whereas omissive behaviors currently are essentially not detected: only the
omissive leader is detected and triggers some action, omissive followers are cured only with the
proactive recovery. Increasing the capability to detect (and quickly react) to omissive behaviors is
a way to improve the overall fault tolerance strategy
5.4.5 Direction for Improvements/Refinements
This section identifies the directions for refining and enhancing the CIS architecture. An
extended fault model is introduced and some modifications to the recovery schemes are presented.
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5.4.5.1 New Fault Model
The PRRW strategy is based on distinguishing and detecting a limited set of faults and
does not consider some subtle faults that can occur in a replica (these faults are however treated
thanks to the strategy of the proactive recoveries). All these faults are discussed hereafter, with the
objective of showing that detecting such faults and treating them using reactive recoveries would
improve both system dependability and availability.
In the PRRW strategy, the correct replicas detect the following faults:
• Leader Benign Fault (LBF): The faulty leader omits to send a signed message to the LAN.
A correct replica will suspect the leader to be “silent” after Ot consecutive leader omissions
on the same signed message.
• Replica Malicious Fault (RMF): The faulty replica (being it either the leader or a follower)
sends a not signed message to the LAN; a correct replica will immediately detect the faulty
replica to be a “malicious sender”.
It comes out that the PRRW schema takes into account both omissive and malicious faults in the
leader replica, but only malicious faults in the follower replicas. The idea is that if a follower is
going to have an omissive behavior, the problem will be eventually treated either by the proactive
recovery or by the election of the replica as a leader (the replica will be extensively monitored in
this case). In both cases, the negative effects of the faults will be eventually eliminated.
The subtle faults not considered by the current reactive recovery proposal are the follow-
ing:
• Malicious Approval (MA): A faulty replica approves an illegal message; the faulty replica
is intruded, because all correct replicas verify the same security policy.
• Omitted Approval (OA): A faulty replica omits to approve a legal message; the omission
could be caused by communication problems (the replica never received the legal message),
but it could be the effect of an intrusion.
• Malicious Suspect (MS): A faulty replica signals the wormhole an accusation about a correct
replica; the faulty replica is intruded, because a correct replica does not show any incorrect
behavior.
• Omitted Suspect (OS): A faulty replica does not signal the wormhole any accusation about a
faulty replica; the omission could be caused by communication problems (the replica never
received the legal message), but it could be still the effect of an intrusion.
In the MA and MS cases, the faulty replica is intruded, so it needs to be recovered as soon as
possible; if the faulty replica is not detected as such, it is still considered correct! In the OA and
OS cases, faults could be caused either by communication omissions (no recovery action is useful
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to solve the problem) or as an effect of intrusions manifesting as omissive behavior (a recovery
action could solve the problem). In all the cases, the proper detection and diagnosis of all the
above faults improves both dependability and availability of the system.
5.4.6 Architectural Modifications for the Detection of the Extended Set of Fault
This Section describes the architecture modifications necessary to detect the faults de-
scribed in 5.4.5.1 and trigger more reactive recoveries. In order to perform the detection of the
above faults it is necessary to allow each payload replica to be informed about all the approval
results and manifested suspects taken by all the other payload replicas.
A shared virtual memory (SVM) mechanism can be implemented as a reliable repository
where each replica posts all its approval results and suspects; a majority of correct replicas is thus
able to identify which replicas took the wrong approval decisions (if any) or manifested the wrong
suspect (if any).
Approval results are stored for each incoming message as a data structure containing i) an
identification for the incoming messagem, ii) the approval decisions collected from all the replicas
about m, iii) the final vote given by the wormhole about m. Suspects are stored as a data structure
containing the suspecter(s), the suspected and the kind of suspect. Information is stored in the
shared virtual memory, using it as a circular buffer in order to make room for newer information;
therefore the SVM is used as a queue of dimension q. If the information to be broadcasted should
be too heavy to be managed through the wormhole, some form of “compression” can be found.
Each message is identified using its MAC. Each approval decisions is stored in an array of
n elements, where the ith element represents approval result of replica i about message m:
• “ACCEPT”: replica i approves m;
• “REJECT”: replica i does not approve m;
• “null”: no approval information still received from replica i about m;
• “recovering”: replica i is currently recovering.
The final vote can be one of the following: “LEGAL”, “ILLEGAL” and “VOTING”.
The follower payload behavior is monitored as follows. When message m comes from the
WAN, each replica decides whether approving it or not, posting the final decision in the SVM. Not
all the replicas will receive m in the same instant, and each replica will need some time in order
to take the approval decision and post it in the repository, but a certain number of approval results
about m will be available in the SVM at worst within Tvote time after the first post.
Replicas that did not take any approval result till that moment and that were not recovering
(those corresponding to the “null” array elements) will be suspected of omission (they could not
have received m because of communication faults or they could have omit maliciously).
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Given the final vote about m, all the correct replicas (i.e. all the replicas which approval
result is in agreement with the final vote) will be able to identify all the faulty ones (i.e. all the
replicas which approval result is in disagreement with the final vote) and suspect them as malicious
faulty replicas.
5.4.6.1 The Priority-Queue Recovery Schema
A recovery schema based on the mechanism of a priority queue (schema PQ) is proposed.
The idea of managing recovery actions using priorities comes from the PRRW strategy, where
reactive recoveries triggered by a quorum of “detections” have a higher priority than recoveries
triggered by some a quorum of accusations (some “suspects” and some other “detections”.
The PQ schema manages the recovery actions (both proactive and reactive) on the basis
of a severity level assigned to each recovery action. Reactive recoveries receive a priority level
depending on the diagnosis of the affected replica: the more severe is the diagnosed fault affecting
the replica, the higher is the priority of the recovery action.
Reactive recoveries have higher priority than proactive recoveries, because postponing a
proactive recovery of a replica that is (seems) correct is less hazardous than postponing a reactive
recovery triggered by some suspect (or certainty) on a misbehaving replica! In order to guarantee
some “progress” to proactive actions, the longer a proactive recovery remains in the queue, the
higher its priority has to become.
A new leader is elected either when the current leader is diagnosed non correct or when a
proactive recovery is going to be performed on it. The new leader is the last replica recovered.
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6 Conclusions
In this report, we described the preliminary specification of services and protocols for the
Crutial Architecture. The Crutial Architecture definition, first addressed in Crutial Project Tech-
nical Report D4 (January 2007), intends to reply to a grand challenge of computer science and
control engineering: how to achieve resilience of critical information infrastructures, in particular
in the electrical sector. We believe that we have given important answers to the problem at archi-
tectural level. The Crutial architecture, services and protocols that we preliminarily define in these
two reports are expected to make a contribution to a reference architecture for CII in general, not
only electrical, but also gas or water, or telecommunication systems and computer networks like
the Internet.
Given the complexity of current and future CII, ensuring acceptable levels of service and,
in last resort, the integrity of systems themselves, when faced with threats of several kinds and
possibly not completely defined, requires innovative approaches. Two key characteristics of any
approach should in our opinion be: automatic and adaptive. Furthermore, any successful ar-
chitecture will have to take into account the hybrid composition of modern critical information
infrastructures, amongst SCADA, corporate and Internet access parts.
We hope to have shown in this report that we are indeed providing answers to meet these
objectives, in the form of the preliminary specification of services and protocols for the Crutial
Architecture: (i) the Runtime Support Services and APIs, and the Middleware Services and APIs;
(ii) the Runtime Support Protocols, and Middleware Services Protocols.
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